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Abstract
Radicalization is an aspect in the development of homegrown terrorists; however,
researchers have been unable to establish a path to radicalization, uncover how individual
and social factors influence radicalization, and identify how the Internet and social media
mediate this process. The purpose of this case study was to explore individual and
environmental factors that contribute to the radicalization of U.S. homegrown terrorists
and identify interventions. Conversion theory was used to develop an understanding of
the radicalization of U.S. homegrown terrorists. Data were derived from interviews of
local and state law enforcement, military antiterrorism officers (AT), and security
personnel from military installations in Eastern North Carolina. Data were analyzed
applying content directed and In Vivo coding. The study results helped formulate
recommendations on interventions to stem radicalization, identified the news media as a
gateway for radicalization, and suggested the incorporation of perspectives from other
radicalization-related theories into the conversion theory radicalization model to examine
known cases of homegrown terrorists and test its viability as a model to understand
radicalization. The results of this study could bring about positive social change by
improving relationships and collaboration between law enforcement and community
stakeholders, which might generate strategies that could exert greater influence in
dissuading individuals from becoming radicalized.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
On September 11, 2001, terrorists staged the most elaborate and deadly attack on
U.S. soil in recorded history. Terrorist operatives seized four commercial airliners and
turned them into weapons of mass destruction. They flew two of the airplanes into the
towers of the World Trade Center in New York and another into the Pentagon in
Washington, DC. The fourth plane crashed in Pennsylvania, and while it is unclear what
the target was, experts suggested that the hijackers intended to crash the plane either into
the capitol building or the White House (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon
the United States, 2004, p. 14). This terrorist attack resulted in an estimated 3,028 deaths
(Arias, Anderson, Kung, Murphy, & Kochanek, 2003). The U.S. government responded
with the full range of diplomatic, security, intelligence, and military capabilities to
combat international terrorism, specifically Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. This led to
the deployment of military forces in pursuit of the Global War on Terrorism and the
death of over 6,855 service members (Fischer, 2015).
The number of military casualties notwithstanding, the lack of any attacks on U.S.
soil in the scale of those of September 11, 2001 might suggest that the combined efforts
of counterterrorist, intelligence, law enforcement, military, and other security
organizations have been effective. It could also mean that terrorist organizations have
adapted to their environment in order to remain viable (Jackson & Loidolt, 2013, p. 288).
The latest incarnation of terrorism has shifted from terrorist organizations centrally
controlling operations to seeking to inspire supporters to conduct terrorism abroad,
especially in Western countries (Mendelsohn, 2011; Brinkley, 2013; Rudner, 2013;
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Bjelopera, 2013; Gunaratna, 2015). These efforts foreshadowed the emergence of the
homegrown terrorist. The approaches that counterterrorism forces have successfully
employed overseas to prevent large-scale terrorist attacks are not suitable to counter
homegrown terrorism threats. There has to be proportionality in the manner in which
security organizations conduct domestic operations so that they do not infringe on
constitutional rights or alienate communities. In this chapter, I will discuss the
background of the problem, define the problem, and discuss the theoretical framework. I
will also provide key definitions, assumptions, limitations, scope and delimitations, and
the significance of the study.
Problem Statement
U.S. counterterrorism efforts abroad successfully prevented large-scale terrorist
attacks since 2001. However, homegrown terrorist incidents increased during that same
period, consistent with terrorist organizations’ desire to inspire terrorist attacks on U.S.
soil (Alexander, 2011; Bergen, Hoffman, & Tiedemann, 2011; Bjelopera, 2013).
Radicalization is a significant aspect in the development of homegrown terrorists (Beutel,
2010; Borum, 2011). In spite of the ongoing research on radicalization, experts have
been unable to establish a path to radicalization (Alexander, 2011), uncover how
individual and social factors influence radicalization (Kleinmann, 2012), and identify
how the Internet and social media mediate this process (Archetti, 2015). The fragmented
nature of radicalization research, the lack of a robust body of empirical research focusing
on the radicalization process (Mastors & Siers, 2014), and the lack of a comprehensive
model for analyzing radicalization (Ferguson & Binks, 2015, p. 21) have also resulted in
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inadequate understanding of the problem. This gap in knowledge leads to ineffective
approaches to curtail radicalization and stem the growth of homegrown terrorism. The
purpose of this qualitative case study was to develop an understanding of the process by
which U.S. citizens, or legal residents, develop the radical ideology that inspires them to
plot or commit acts of terrorism.
Nature of the Study
In this qualitative case study, I derived data from interviews with law enforcement
officials at the local and state levels with counterterrorism or gang experience, as well as
AT officers and security personnel from military installations in Eastern North Carolina.
The interview data, coupled with current radicalization research, was used to develop a
better understanding of the process that leads to the radicalization of U.S. homegrown
terrorists, while applying the religious conversion theory as a model for understanding
radicalization. Eastern North Carolina is important, both regionally and nationally,
across various categories. This region of North Carolina is home to the Research
Triangle Park (RTP). This enterprise occupies over 7,000 acres, employs over 39,000
high tech workers, and incorporates over 200 companies that support a variety of efforts
including defense, infectious disease research, and advanced computing technology
research (The Research Triangle Park, 2015). This area also hosts the Triangle Center on
Terrorism and Homeland Security, a collaborative initiative that brings together the
University of North Carolina, Duke University, and the Research Triangle Institute
International (RTI) to develop a better understanding of terrorism and to develop
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counterterrorism approaches through the inclusion of stakeholders from academia,
government, and industry sectors (Duke University, 2015).
North Carolina also has seven major military installations, with over 110,000
active duty military members that generate more than 540,000 jobs (McCrory, 2014, p.
17). Three of these bases have particular significance because military forces from these
bases are actively engaged in combat operations supporting counterterrorism efforts
abroad. Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, set in Goldsboro, is the home station for the
Fourth Fighter Wing, which includes over 6,000 military and 600 civilian personnel (US
Air Force, 2016). Camp Lejeune, located near Jacksonville, is one of the largest United
States Marine Corps (USMC) bases, with a population of over 114,000 military, civilians,
and family members (Castellvi, 2013, p. 11). Major units stationed at this base include
Marine Corps expeditionary units that have contributed to military efforts overseas (US
Marine Corps, 2016). Finally, 73 miles south of the RTP, in Fayetteville, is Fort Bragg,
the largest Army base in the world. It is home of U.S. Army airborne and special forces
that support national contingency defense efforts. Over 63,000 military and 11,000
civilian employees work at this installation, which is home for over 21,000 family
members, and supports over 250,000 military, civilians, and retirees (U.S. Army, 2015).
Terrorism threats to these locations are a significant concern for law enforcement,
and there is evidence to support these concerns. In recent years, three U.S.-born citizens
(Daniel Patrick Boyd, Erwin Antonio Rios, and Justin Sullivan) engaged in terror-related
activities in Eastern North Carolina, which led to terrorism-related charges (Robertson,
2011; Walker, 2013; US Department of Justice, 2015). Law enforcement,
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counterterrorism, and AT specialists near these sites should be prepared to identify
potential threats to their security, including homegrown terrorists, and could contribute to
a better understanding of the process that leads to the radicalization of U.S. homegrown
terrorists. Neither the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) nor the Triangle Center on
Terrorism and Homeland Security accepted invitations to participate in the study.
The study population for this study was a purposive sample of law enforcement
officials at the local and state levels with counterterrorism or gang experience, as well as
AT officers and security personnel from military installations in Eastern North Carolina.
Researchers use purposive sampling to deliberately seek participants who can contribute
to a deeper understanding of the phenomenon under investigation because of their indepth knowledge and experience in the matter (Rudestam & Newton, 2015, p. 123).
Local law enforcement officials usually are more familiar with their operational
environment and are better qualified to recognize indicators and warnings of potential
threats (Brooks, 2011). The adoption of community policing practices (ie., in which
police officers and community leaders cooperate to prioritize police efforts, identify
problems, and improve public safety) further elevates the role of the local police officer
(Aziz, 2014, p. 156). Community policing, an initiative that law enforcement agencies
have implemented worldwide, focuses on the efforts of an individual police officer or a
team of officers focusing on a geographic area or community (Terpstra, 2011, p. 92).
Police officers and sheriff deputies at the local level might not possess the requisite level
of experience, training, or clearance that enables them to provide the perspectives
required for this study. The participant sample, therefore, included individuals who had
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the requisite security clearance to access relevant intelligence and have counterterrorism
and AT experience. The participant pool also included law enforcement officials with
gang experience because gang members usually undergo a similar radicalization process,
and an understanding of gangs can provide insights into radicalization and extremism
(Decker & Pyrooz, 2015). The inclusion of the perspectives of counterterrorism experts
from state agencies, military AT, and security officers provided a diverse perspective on
the issue and improved the reliability and validity of the research through triangulation
(Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014, pp. 312-313). Participant responses were analyzed
to identity themes and patterns using content directed and In Vivo coding.
Case study research was appropriate for this research because it helped me to
develop an in-depth understanding of a contemporary phenomenon (Yin, 2014). This
involves the analysis of an actual event or phenomenon, and it provides empirical data
that could inform the development of relevant theories or interventions (Mastors & Siers,
2014, p. 386). Silke (as cited in Chermak & Gruenwald, 2015) argued that researchers
have relied mostly on the review of radicalization literature reviews rather than on
original, field collected data to develop an understanding of terrorism (p. 134). The
phenomenon that I addressed was the radicalization process of U.S. homegrown
terrorists.
Research Questions
Q1: What individual and environmental factors contribute to the radicalization of
U.S. homegrown terrorists?
Q2: What form of intervention would be effective to curtail radicalization?
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Q3: How would a modification of the conversion theory serve to explain the
radicalization of U.S. homegrown terrorists?
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this qualitative case study was explore the process that leads to the
radicalization of U.S. homegrown terrorists and to apply the religious conversion theory
as a model for understanding the radicalization of U.S. homegrown terrorists. I
incorporated data from interviews with law enforcement officials at the local and state
levels with counterterrorism or gang experience, AT officers, and security personnel from
military installations in Eastern North Carolina.
This study will contribute to knowledge in the field of radicalization in two ways.
First, I considered the perspectives of law enforcement officials at the local and state
levels, as well as military AT officials. The lack of a substantial body of empirical
research in the radicalizing field is a known gap in the research, and a case study
involving perspectives from law enforcement officials, counterterrorism, and military AT
officers should contribute towards filling that gap. I sought to understand radicalization
from the perspective of those who have to address it daily in the real world. Another
known gap in the literature was the lack of a model to understand radicalization. I
applied the religious conversion theory (Rambo, 1993) as a model to understand the
radicalization process of U.S. homegrown terrorists. I also compared the stages of
radicalization, according to the religious conversion theory, to data from current
radicalization research and the perspectives of study participants. It was critical that
interview questions integrated key aspects of the theory in order to identify the
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manifestation of the theory’s principles in the real world. The study was ideologically
neutral; I did not focus on ideologies, religious beliefs, or political philosophies, but
rather the radicalization process of U.S. homegrown terrorists in general.
In a doctoral qualitative case study, (Mouras, 2013) considered the perspectives of
the ranking law enforcement officers at the county level (the sheriff) on factors leading to
radicalization as they related to criminal and terrorist activity. Mouras framed the
research according to rational choice and deterrence theories and conducted
semistructured interviews with sheriffs at an unidentified location in the United States.
Mouras identified five factors related to radicalization: psychological, state of mind,
social environment, individual financial issues, ideology, and Internet communications.
Mouras’ findings supported the application of the religious conversion theory as a model
to understand radicalization because the factors fall within at least three of its stages.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework for this study was Rambo’s (1993) religious
conversion theory (from this point referred to as the conversion theory), which
incorporates aspects of sociology, psychology, anthropology, and religious studies.
Although it is not a public policy theory, it helped frame the study to understand a
phenomenon with significant public policy and social implications. This theory provided
a model that could provide insights into a better understanding of how individual factors,
experiences, and dynamics relate to the religious, social, and cultural environment of
individuals. The conversion process (or radicalization in the case of terrorists) entails a
series of stages that have a cumulative effect upon individuals that lead to the adoption of
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a new moral paradigm (Rambo, 1993; Rambo & Bauman, 2012). The radicalization
process shares similarities with religious conversion and the use of a religious conversion
model could be useful in understanding the complexity of such an abstract concept
(Ferguson & Binks, 2015, p. 26).
Law enforcement officials with counterterrorism training and gang experience
were able to share their perspectives on the manifestation of the stages, revealing how
individuals progress along the radicalization continuum, which should help develop
trends and patterns associated with the process and contribute to the further grounding of
the conversion theory. The perspectives of knowledgeable law enforcement officials at
the local and state levels, military AT officers, and security personnel proved invaluable
in understanding the radicalization process, as it applies to people in the United States.
Their perspectives also assisted in conducting a preliminary assessment of the suitability
of the conversion theory as a useful tool for understanding radicalization in a broader
context. Through the conversion theory, Rambo (1993) postulated that individuals seek a
way to find balance, a sense of self-worth, or purpose that they lost because of a crisis.
Individuals who embrace extremist ideologies that lead to their radicalization should
present particular individual and environmental factors that predispose them to accepting
new ideas or experience paradigmatic changes in their worldview (Rambo, 1993). Their
exposure to these new ideas could be the work of an advocate, agent of change, or the
initiative of the individuals themselves (self-radicalization) (Rambo, 1993). This
experience would lead them to eschew their old perspectives in favor of newer ones that
promise to restore order in their lives and provide them a sense of purpose. This search
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sets the conditions for the acceptance and internalization of extremist views, an essential
element for radicalization. The interviews with knowledgeable law enforcement officials
at the local and state levels, military AT officers, and security personnel generated
empirical data to facilitate the identification of patterns and trends common among
radicalized individuals. Furthermore, the study participants were able to provide their
insights regarding counterradicalization by suggesting intervention approaches and the
most appropriate means for transmitting the counterradicalization message.
Definition of Terms
U.S. homegrown terrorism: Terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the
United States or abroad by U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, or visitors
radicalized largely within the United States (Bjelopera, 2014a).
Antiterrorism: The combination of defensive measures used to protect individuals
and infrastructure against terrorism threats. It includes the efforts of organizations within
the intelligent, military, and law enforcement communities (U.S. Army , 2008, p. 10).
Commuity policing: Law enforcement program designed to empower minority
communities to help define policing priorities and improve safety. It provides
personalized policing by which the same officer services an assigned area, proactively
working with the area inhabitants to identify and solve problems (Aziz, 2014, p. 156).
Counterterrorism: Activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their
organizations and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill
fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals (Joint Publication 3-26,
2014, pp. GL-3).

11
Radicalization: The process of developing ideologies and beliefs that society
deems extremist or radical (Aly & Striegher, Examining the role of religion in
radicalization to violent Islamist extremism, 2012, p. 850).
Terrorism: Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually to influence an
audience (Annual Country Reports on Terrorism Act of 2014).
Assumptions
In this study, I assumed that participants would have limited understanding of
radicalization because their duties did not require this knowledge. This lack of
knowledge notwithstanding, it was expected that they would be forthcoming and
transparent in their answers. Finally, it was assumed that the collection and analysis of
data from a variety of sources would imbue the study with sufficient validity and
trustworthiness that would allow the findings to contribute to body of evidence in the
field of radicalization.
Limitations
This study might not be able to yield generalizable findings that could apply to
other areas of the country because of its qualitative nature and the small sample size.
Although the conversion theory provides a holistic model that incorporates features from
sociology, anthropology, psychology, and religious studies, the use of the proposed
stages of conversion might prevent the consideration of other factors outside of the
theoretical construct. Finally, although a case study will provide valuable empirical data
from the perspective of the participants, I collected data from individuals with experience
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in counterterrorism, AT, and gangs, not those who experienced radicalization. The
sample population consequently deprived the study from a valuable perspective that
merits additional research. Neither the FBI nor the Triangle Center on Terrorism and
Homeland Security accepted invitations to participate in the study; thus, the research did
not include the perspectives of counterterrorism experts from the academic field or
federal law enforcement. Several military and local law enforcement officers, however,
had previous experience with federal counterterrorism organizations.
Scope and Delimitations
In this qualitative case study, I considered the perspectives of law enforcement
officials at the local and state levels with counterterrorism or gang experience, as well as
AT officers and security personnel from military installations in Eastern North Carolina
on the radicalization process of U.S. homegrown terrorists. The data collected through
the interviews and current radicalization research facilitated the identification of patterns
and trends common among radicalized individuals and allowed for a preliminary
assessment of the conversion theory as a model for understanding radicalization. I did
not attempt to assess the effectiveness of existing counterterrorism efforts aimed at
curbing the growth of homegrown terrorism or to explore the level of collaboration
between law enforcement and community stakeholders.
I did not focus on a particular form of radical- or extremist-inspired radicalization.
Although much of the media has focused on Islamist-inspired terrorism, other sources of
radicalization merit consideration. In addition to Islamist extremists, there is evidence
that eco-extremists, anarchists, White supremacists, antigovernment extremists, and
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antiabortion extremists present a significant threat to domestic security as well.
Independent of the professed ideology of prospective homegrown terrorists, the adoption
of extremist views involves a process of socialization by which they learn the values,
norms, and skills consistent with their worldview (Williams, 2011, p. 172). This process
is critical to understanding radicalization and could potentially inform future research.
Finally, I did not test the conversion theory, but rather set the conditions for a follow-up
quantitative study for that purpose.
Significance of Study
The results of this study can be used to increase the understanding of the process
that leads to the radicalization of U.S. homegrown terrorists. It has social as well as
public policy implications. It is important to understand the radicalization process before
attempting to develop intervention strategies, which could prove ineffective or
counterproductive. Efforts to combat radicalization require more than law enforcement
action; they require greater involvement and contributions from stakeholders across all
sectors of society (Bjelopera, 2013).
The results of this study could bring about positive social change by improving
the degree of collaboration between the government and community-based organizations,
which might generate strategies that could exert greater influence in dissuading
individuals from becoming radicalized (Archetti, 2015). Closer collaboration among key
stakeholders might also improve the relationship between law enforcement and local
communities.
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From a public policy perspective, the findings from this research could inform
modifications to the government’s approach to combating radical extremism by providing
empirical data on the perspectives of radicalization from the individuals charged with the
implementation of counterterrorism program directives and improving collaboration
between communities and police departments. Law enforcement officials living in the
communities in which they serve have increased familiarity with their environment and
are better qualified to recognize indicators and warnings of potential threats (Brooks,
2011). The findings from this study could also inform training programs for local law
enforcement officials that could enhance their ability to recognize indicators of
radicalization among members of the communities they serve.
Finally, from a research and academic perspective, the results of this study could
provide the impetus for additional research aimed at testing the conversion theory
through a quantitative case study approach. The validation of the conversion theory
could help further research in the field by providing a holistic model for understanding
radicalization. This test should satisfy one of the identified gaps in literature regarding
knowledge in the radicalization field.
Summary and Transition
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to develop empirical data from
interviews with law enforcement officials at the local and state levels with
counterterrorism and gang experience, as well as AT officers and security personnel from
military installations in Eastern North Carolina. The interview data, coupled with current
radicalization research, helped develop a better understanding of the process that leads to

15
the radicalization of U.S. homegrown terrorists through the application of the conversion
theory as model to understand the radicalization process. The findings could lead to the
development of a useful model for understanding radicalization and appropriate
intervention approaches.
In Chapter 2, I examine the current literature on radicalization. In Chapter 3, I
address the methodology and theoretical framework for the study. Chapter 4 includes the
discussion of the analysis of the data. Finally, in Chapter 5, I provide a summary, the
findings of the study, derived conclusions, areas of further research, and
recommendations for further action.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to develop empirical data from
interviews with law enforcement officials at the local and state levels with
counterterrorism and gang experience and AT officers from military installations in
Eastern North Carolina. The interview data, coupled with current radicalization research,
helped develop a better understanding of the process that leads to the radicalization of
U.S. homegrown terrorists. In ongoing research on radicalization, scholars have been
unable to establish a path to radicalization (Alexander, 2011), uncover how individual
and social factors influence radicalization (Kleinmann, 2012), and identify how the
Internet and social media mediate this process (Archetti, 2015). The lack of a robust
body of empirical research on radicalization (Mastors & Siers, 2014, p. 386), coupled
with the absence of a comprehensive model for analyzing radicalization (Ferguson &
Binks, 2015, p. 21), preclude a deeper understanding of the problem.
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, stakeholders in the
law enforcement field called for an increased role of local law enforcement agencies in
homeland security efforts (Ortiz, Hendricks, & Su, 2007, p. 94). The adoption of
community policing practices makes the local police officer a contributor to domestic
counterterrorism efforts (Aziz, 2014, p. 156). Community policing revolves around the
efforts of individual police officers or a team of officers operating in a community
(Terpstra, 2011, p. 92). This study provided them with the opportunity to contribute their
experience to validate the tenets of the conversion theory and the development of
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intervention approaches that could help stem radicalization and the rise of homegrown
terrorists.
This literature review has nine major sections. The first is radicalization, which
includes current literature on radicalization related research. The second is context,
which includes perspectives of individual factors as well as the relationships and social
networks of individuals, and how they influence the radicalization process. The third
section concerns the role of the Internet and social media as a source of extremist
indoctrination and recruitment. In the fourth section, I explored counterterrorism and
deradicalization efforts at reversing the effects of radicalization. The fifth section,
empirical research, addresses one of the suggested gaps in radicalization research. The
sixth section, homegrown terrorism, is an assessment of the threat that homegrown
terrorism represents to security in the United States. The seventh section addresses the
conversion theory. The eighth section includes research on gangs, which could help
inform radicalization research in general. Radicalization is a complex problem, which
requires the consideration of insights from a variety of sources and the development of a
comprehensive model to explain it.
Search Strategy
The main source for the literature search for this study was the Walden University
online library and a variety of databases, such as ProQuest, International Security &
Counter Terrorism Reference Center, Military and Government Collection, Political
Science Complete, and Homeland Security Digital Library. Other significant sources
included governmental websites such as the United States Department of State Bureau of
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Counterterrorism, Library of Congress, and the Congressional Research Service. Other
sources also included the RAND Corporation, Brookings Institute, and the Heritage
Foundation. Keyword searches included the following: terrorism, homegrown terrorism,
lone wolf terrorism, American jihad, Al Qaeda, terror plots, 9/11, ISIS, Osama Bin
Laden, radicalization, violent extremism, extremism, gangs, and domestic terrorism. As
previously discussed, I did not focus on an ideological underpinning, but rather on the
radicalization process.
Radicalization
Radicalization, in general terms, is the process by which individuals adopt
extremist ideologies and beliefs (Borum, 2011, p. 30). Through this process, individuals
adopt agenda driven values and beliefs that are consistent only among a small number of
militants or revolutionaries, and which might lead to violence in pursuit of the newly
adopted worldview (Carter & Carter, 2012, p. 140).
Although scholars have suggested a link between radicalization and terrorism, it is
difficult to establish a causal relationship because having or adopting extremist views
does not make a person a terrorist. The process by which individuals develop radical
ideologies that lead them to embrace terrorism is a matter of continued research and
debate. However, radicalization does not occur in a vacuum; each one of the perpetrators
of terrorism has undergone a socialization process by which he or she was able to justify
the use of violence to advance his or her ideological agenda. The source of radical
ideologies also varies among a wide range of possibilities. Radicalization might
influence a range of terrorist motivations. Some of these include nationalist separatist
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movements like the Irish Republican Army (Ferguson & Binks, 2015); individuals with
political grievances like Ted Kaczynski, the unabomber, (McCauley, Moskalenko, &
Son, 2013); and other radical groups such as animal rights and environmental extremists,
anarchists, White supremacists, antigovernment extremists, Black separatists, and
antiabortion extremists (Bjelopera, 2014b).
Hafez and Mullins (2015) summarized the proposed causes for radicalization of
individuals with Western ties. Hafez and Mullins proposed four factors that lead to their
adoption of extremism: grievances, both personal and collective; networks, associations,
and personal relationships; religious and political ideological beliefs; and environmental
enablers and supporting structures. Hafez and Mullins recommended closer collaboration
between from intelligence and academic stakeholders and improved access to data from
academic research that could inform ongoing efforts. Finally, Hafez and Mullins
recommended the development of research approaches that do not rely solely on testing
theories in the presence of radicalization, but rather seek to rebut alleged causes of in
order to elucidate the factors related to radicalization.
Zekulin (2015) discussed the origins of the homegrown terrorism term and
discussed a new analysis model. According to Zekulin, the term refers to individuals
born, raised, or who have strong attachments to Western countries, and who act on their
own accord without guidance or direction from organized terrorist groups. Zekulin
argued that a more current definition should include the concept of radicalized
individuals, who not only intend to conduct acts in their home countries, but also intend
to travel abroad to engage in violent struggle, or jihad, and those who provide nonviolent
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support in their home countries. Zekulin proposed a new term, Islamic-Inspired
Homegrown Terrorist (IIHGT), as a more precise definition of its current manifestation.
Zekulin further proposed that a better approach for understanding the homegrown
terrorist threat would be to focus on their objectives or endgames. This approach would
differentiate cognitive radicalization from behavior radicalization, with the former
leading to the adoption and nonviolent support for the new ideology, and the latter
resulting in engaging in violence, in support of jihadist struggles abroad. This new focus
on endgames, Zekulin argued, would provide a new lens from which to analyze their
radicalization.
The U.S. government, through the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)
Program, developed initiatives and allocated resources to combat radicalization, with
increased funding for programs that include greater involvement of law enforcement and
communities. The aim of these programs is to develop a stronger, sustainable, and more
flexible interaction among stakeholders from a broad variety of sectors, such as
academia, community organizations, the arts, and technology-driven organizations. This
effort places greater emphasis on the role of local law enforcement organizations in their
implementation of community policing efforts, creating pilot programs at Boston, Los
Angeles, and the Twin Cities (Office of the Press Secretary, 2015). Radicalization
research is an emerging discipline that provides opportunities for novel approaches to
expand knowledge in the field. In order to provide generalizability, establish causality,
and determine how antecedent beliefs and behaviors might influence the process,
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researchers should move beyond the limited cases that informed previous understanding
of radicalization and focus on new data and cases (Brooks, 2011, p. 13).
Klausen, Campion, Needle, Nguyen, and Libretti (2016) applied the Silber and
Bhatt radicalization model (which consists of four phases: preradicalization, selfidentification, indoctrination, and jihadization) to establish a path to radicalization based
on the analysis of 68 cases drawn from court documents, convicted terrorists’ online
postings, and files from government investigations and the media. Klausen et al. sought
to use qualitatively derived factors for subsequent quantitative analysis and revealed 24
factors associated with the radicalization process. Klausen et al. asserted that the
ideology (in this case Salafism) creates the predictability required to inform an
understanding the progression along the radicalization process leading to violence. A key
assertion of this study revolves around the application of the model to other ideologies in
order to identify mechanisms that lead to radicalization.
Chermak and Gruenwald (2015) studied the individual and environmental factors
of right wing, left wing, and Al Qaeda inspired violent extremists in the United States.
Through this analysis, Chermak and Gruenwald developed four conclusions that sought
to identify and understand the differences between adherents from each ideology. First,
terrorists lack a sense of significance that drives them to violence as a means to achieve
their goals. Second, extremists develop narratives that identify threats and targets for
violence. Third, extremists adapt to their environment, adopting perspectives that justify
violence in retaliation for real or perceived threats. Finally, the external environment,
such as the community in which they live, influences extremist behaviors. Chermak and
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Gruenwald aimed at highlighting patterns that could provide a better understanding of the
characteristics and motivations of violent extremists and enable future research.
Research in the radicalization field highlights the complex nature of this
phenomenon. The data suggests there are many factors that might influence
radicalization. It also implies that previous efforts to shed light on the problem have been
ineffective for a variety of reasons. It is important to consider the input from
organizations at all levels in order to gain a better understanding of the dynamics
associated with radicalization; this effort should not reside solely in the academic or
political realm. By gathering the perspectives of local law enforcement officers and
military AT officials, who are critical in the intervention at the local level, this study
might contribute to the existing body of knowledge aimed at understanding of the
radicalization process of homegrown terrorists regardless of their ideology
Context
Personal relationships and support networks are critical as they relate to the
adoption of behaviors. Archetti (2015) suggested that individuals do not adopt new
ideological paradigms just because they access materials or propaganda; they interpret
these messages based on their world-view and the understanding of their role in society,
thus developing a personal identity that has a unique narrative. Archetti further argued
that in the case of terrorists, their identity and narrative legitimizes the use of violence to
achieve their purposes. Radicalization depends on the confluence of individual identity,
personal narratives, and relationship networks, making it both a contextual and temporal
outcome (Archetti, 2015, p. 54)
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Costanza (2015) studied radicalization among at-risk youth and argued that
radicalization research fails to appreciate how the social environment affects cognitive
development and shapes an individual’s worldview. Costanza advocated for a discursive
approach to studying radicalization, which emphasizes consideration of culture to provide
context for the radicalization process. This approach accounts for a multitude of
behaviors associated with different cultures, proving more relevant than a causality-based
approach that seeks to predict behavior. Costanza also argued for the application of
social positioning theory to study radicalization, which emphasizes the role of the
individual in the radicalization process. Costanza concluded that understanding how
socio-cultural factors affect behavior should help develop approaches that include a
broader community involvement to prevent radicalization. The importance of the
individual’s context is relevant to understanding the environmental factors that influence
radicalization and how to develop counterterrorism efforts.
Malthaner (2014) analyzed the role of the social environment on the radicalization
of homegrown terrorists and argued that terrorism and radicalization researchers
oftentimes fail to consider the social and political context of the terrorist. The analysis
emphasized the importance of relational networks in the normative formation
(radicalization) of its members. The complexity of these relationships makes it difficult
to understand their dynamics by focusing on individual factors, predispositions, or
vulnerabilities. According to Malthaner, researchers should consider the environment in
which individuals socialize in order to understand how they advance along the path to
radicalization.
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Alexander (2011) analyzed how Al Qaeda (AQ) and Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) are able to inspire supporters to engage in terrorism on U.S. soil.
Alexander reviewed the cases of 20 individuals unaffiliated with AQ/AQAP, but felt
inspired by these organization’s leaders or ideology, and highlighted the number of
prosecuted cases of terrorism in the United States since September 11, 2001 as an
illustration of the significance of this trend. Alexander discussed the differences in the
individual background, motivations, and levels of sophistication of the unaffiliated and
affiliated terrorists. Alexander argued that radicalization, terrorist recruitment, training,
and execution of attacks could diverge significantly among cases, and concluded that
self-selected, unaffiliated individuals were more likely to be successful in their efforts
because of the simplicity of their plans, and their ability to avoid surveillance, even if
their plots would result in less extensive damage. Finally, Alexander advocated for the
development of counter narratives to challenge extremist messages.
Kleinmann (2012) studied the radicalization of homegrown Sunni Muslims from
2001 to 2010 in order to determine which factor had greater influence on radicalization:
individual, group, or mass forces by comparing the radicalization rates among converts
and non-coverts among the 83 cases selected. Kleinmann established that among
radicalized Muslims converts, individual factors were more relevant. This means that
individuals in their inner circle are more likely to persuade them along radical lines than
groups or society. Kleinmann found no differences among converts and non-converts
regarding group factors and suggested that mass factors had no significant impact on
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radicalization. These conclusions shed light on the challenges associated with devising
counter narratives to extremist propaganda.
Aly and Striegher (2012) conducted a case study of the radicalization of Jack
Roche, a British citizen who Australian authorities convicted on terrorism charges in
2004. Aly and Striegher assessed the applicability of a four-stage radicalization model
for their study consisting of pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination, and
jihadization. According to Aly and Striegher, Roche’s conversion to Islam in 1992 was
an effort to counter feelings of isolation and emptiness, resulting from two divorces, a
failed attempt to follow in his family legacy of military service, and alcoholism. Roche
moved to Indonesia to learn more about Islam and later joined Jamaah Islameeah (JI), a
jihadist organization in Australia, in 1997. Roche traveled to Afghanistan in 2000, where
he underwent military and explosives training, and received orders to conduct
surveillance on the Israeli embassy in Canberra in preparation for a bombing attack. Aly
and Striegher argued that that although religion could influence radicalization, other
secular factors could also influence the extent of the radicalization process.
Aly and Striegher concluded that continued exposure to extremism and a close
association with radical individuals are important factors that could propel individuals to
radicalization, with religion playing a lesser role. Accordingly, Aly and Striegher argued
that adoption of Islam is not a precursor to extremism and jihadization, thus assessing
that the pre-radicalization phase of the model was not useful in explaining the
radicalization of Jack Roche. This argument could also apply to other sources of
extremism and provides a potentially useful entry point from which counterterrorism
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officials could attempt intervention approaches that could impede the progression along
the radicalization continuum.
Hörnqvist and Flyghed (2012) studied two perspectives of radicalization, which
contributed a significant level of ambiguity in the understanding and reactions to the
phenomenon. After analyzing policy documents and scientific articles published in
Europe since 2005, Hörnqvist and Flyghed assessed each of the perspectives in terms of
their explanations for the causes of terrorism, the radicalization process (at the individual
level), and the countermeasures that the government implemented. According to
Hörnqvist and Flyghed, the culturalist perspective posited that terrorism was the result of
clashes between western and immigrant cultures that leads to an inevitable threat to
western civilization. The radicalization process according to this perspective is an
external influence and has little to do with the socio-economic status of the individual.
The responses (or countermeasures) associated with this perspective revolve around
engagement with the community to dissuade the radicalization of potential recruits early
in the process.
Hörnqvist and Flyghed argued that the social exclusion perspective considers
social integration as a key variable in radicalization; individuals who are active members
of the greater social fabric are less likely to radicalize, whereas those who live at the
margins of society are at greater risk of radicalization. Radicalization, according to this
perspective, involves a self-radicalization process, in which individuals have no direct
connection with extremist recruiters, but rather originates from grass root efforts. In
order to counter the radicalization process, proponents of this perspective advocate for
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the implementation of tangible social programs to solve sources of social inequality, such
as unemployment, substandard living conditions, and education. Hörnqvist and Flyghed
also discussed how public officials, based on their ideological standing, tend to prefer a
particular perspective, and which might lead to inconsistent and contradictory policies
once the government changes leaders.
Passy (as cited in Bowman-Grieve, 2013) underscored the importance of
networks as an influencing factor on behavior that could lead them to joining extremist
movements. Passy asserted that social networks play an important role in the
recruitment, decision-making, and socialization of its members. Communities, whether
tangible or virtual, provide a safe haven for extremists, functioning as a forum to validate
their beliefs, further their understanding of the movement’s ideology, and encourage their
commitment and participation in its activities (Bowman-Grieve, 2013, p. 2).
Hibbert (2012) researched the inclusion of reflexivity in management education as
a means to develop critical thinking or reflection. The literature on this topic associates
reflexivity to the process by which individuals examine their assumptions as they relate
to problem solving, and challenges to those assumptions that lead to changes in thought
processes. Hibbert suggested a series of approaches for teaching reflexivity. One
approach includes the stimulation and facilitating critical thought through dialogue
associated with factors such as gender, class, race, social status, sexual orientation, and
physical capabilities or limitations. Another approach relates to exposing students to
concepts and perspectives that challenge their personal worldview, not in an attempt to
change their own views, but to understand the existence of other, and equally valid
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interpretations of society. One other method would be the introduction of topics that
challenge established managerial concepts or even educational texts and sources.
According to Hibbert, individuals can learn to react and accept different perspectives,
even if they challenge their closely held worldviews, or their beliefs about the system or
community with whom they interact. Finally, Hibbert posited that critical thinking and
reasoning is an acquired skill.
Hopkins, Green, and Brookes (2013) reviewed research related to early childhood
literacy and brain development. Research into literacy suggests that a child’s formative
years influence heavily the cognitive and socio emotional development. Hopkins et al.
argued that for children to master literacy, they must also develop innate skills alongside
the development of cognitive skills. According to neuroscience research, there is a close
relationship between brain development and genetics, personal experiences, and the
environment. Through this study, Hopkins et al. suggested that parental and community
support during early childhood is a critical requirement for the development of skills that
enable individuals to react to and engage with environment, acquire feelings of trust, and
the ability to self-regulate their behavior.
Czernochowski (2014) researched the influence of age and experience with
previous conflict resolution in the identification of errors and subsequent adjustments in
an effort to reduce conflicts associated with incorrect responses using
electrophysiological markers. Czernochowski studied the responses of individuals from
different age groups: children (seven to eight years old), children (10 to 11 years old),
adults (20 to 25 years old), and older adults (66 to 74 years old) to incorrect responses to
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a test. Through this study, Czernochowski suggested that as they age, individuals should
be able to improve their ability to identify and resolve conflict. These findings are
important as they relate to the ability to learn from previous mistakes to adjust to the
changing environment, and avoid future mistakes.
The Internet and Social Media
The influence of the Internet in radicalization and terrorism is a matter of debate
among key stakeholders. Government reports characterize the Internet as another front in
the counterterrorism effort. Spaaij and Hammd (2015) acknowledged a pervasive use of
the Internet among terrorist organizations, yet did not view initiatives that limit access to
the Internet as a linchpin in counter radicalization efforts. Before the wide use of the
Internet and social media, terrorist or extremist communicated only to their members,
limiting the reach of their propaganda (Spaaij & Hammd, 2015, p. 170).
In their report for Congress, Theohary and Rollins (2011) discussed how ISIS
established an online support network and effectively conveyed their extremist message
via social media. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) used a U.S. born
spokesperson, Anwar al-Awlaki, to spread their message with an online publication in
English: Inspire Magazine. Al-Awlaki’s rhetoric and exhortations might have played a
role in the 2010 Times Square bombing plot, Major Nidal Hasan’s shooting spree at Fort
Hood in 2009, and a foiled bombing of Northwest/Delta Airlines Flight 253 on Christmas
2009. ISIS employs modern Hollywood style productions and disseminates them via
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to gain followers for their cause (Gunaratna, 2015, p.
11). The investigation of the April 2013 Boston Marathon bombing revealed that
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Tamerlan Tsarnaev not only accessed bomb making instructions on the Internet, but also
listened to extremist speeches from a radical Islamist cleric from Australia, Sheikh Feiz
Mohammad, as well as sermons by Anwar al-Awlaki (Gunaratna & Haynal, 2013, pp.
51-52).
Lemieux, Brachman, Levitt, and Wood (2014) analyzed how Inspire Magazine,
an AQAP English language publication influenced terrorism in the U.S. by applying the
Information, Motivation, Behavioral Skills (IMB) framework to assess behavioral
change. Lemieux et al. suggested that online content has had significant influence in the
growth of homegrown terrorism by providing ideological content to further radicalization
and technical knowledge that could enable homegrown terrorists to carry out attacks
successfully. Lemieux et al. recommended further analysis of online content such as
Inspire to develop effective behavior modification interventions.
Bowman-Grieve (2013) researched how extremist movements, particularly right
wing radicals, established virtual communities to support recruitment, coordination,
surveillance, fund raising, and continued indoctrination. Through this case study,
Bowman-Grieve suggested that the Internet provides a medium by which individuals who
espouse a particular ideology are able to access materials that fuel their convictions and
communicate with individuals who share their views. Access to online propaganda and
involvement with virtual communities could serve as means by which individuals could
become more active in extremist activities. Bowman-Grieve highlighted how the White
supremacist movement leverages music as an important avenue to recruit adherents to

31
their ideology. This music genre exposes listeners to their grievances, agenda issues, and
promotes intolerance and violence against minority groups.
Janbek and Williams (2014) conducted a case study of nine Islamic terrorists and
their use of the Internet since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and evaluated
government counterterrorism efforts related to Internet use and the legal challenges
associated with these practices. Janbek and Williams argued that terrorist organizations
use the Internet to support their recruitment efforts, bolster radicalization and
indoctrination, to inspire and plan attacks, and establish a support network for extremists.
Janbek and Williams also found that government efforts to stymie the effectiveness of the
terrorists’ use of the Internet, such as the creation of fake terrorist websites and increased
surveillance, prevented specific terrorist plots from coming to fruition. These efforts
however, clashed with legal advocates, civil liberty activists, and general public outcry
over their legality. Through this study, Janbek and Williams highlighted how terrorist
organizations employ the Internet with varying levels of effectiveness, and how the
complex nature of conducting counterterrorism operations in the virtual domain will
require law enforcement and security agencies to adjust their practices to meet legal and
ethical standards.
In spite of the recognition that terrorist organizations have exploited the Internet
to advance their agenda, legal challenges, and technical constraints, make it difficult for
the government to implement initiatives to counter this effort. Research suggests
however, that efforts at limiting the exposure to extremist rhetoric and messaging via the
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Internet might not reduce its radicalization effect and that perhaps interpersonal
relationships had a greater influence on radicalization (Bowman-Grieve, 2013).
Most extremist groups have leveraged the power of the Internet to make their
messages available to individuals who are prepared to accept their narrative because it is
consistent with their own worldview (Bowman-Grieve, 2013, p. 2). Online content is
readily available to anyone, making the dissemination of extremist messages easier than
in the past (Jackson & Loidolt, 2013, p. 285). The Internet has enabled the creation of
virtual communities. Sageman (as cited in Gunaratna and Haynal, 2013) argued that the
Internet provides the means to develop a sense of unity and purpose that although
confined to the virtual environment, might serve as a gateway to further radicalization
through personal contact. This was the case of Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the Boston Marathon
bomber (p. 48).
Brynielsson, Horndahl, Johansson, Kaati, Mårtenson, Svenson, and Pontus,
(2013) studied how potential terrorists use the Internet as a means to communicate among
their confederates, share ideologically charged rhetoric, and plan their attacks.
Brynielsson et al. acknowledged that lone wolfs, or individuals, who operate independent
of terrorist organization control, are more difficult to detect and interdict, but their
reliance on the Internet presents an opportunity for surveillance and monitoring, although
their digital footprint might be small. Brynielsson et al. suggested 16 markers that could
indicate the potential for individuals to engage in terrorist motivated violence.
Aziz (2014) analyzed community policing efforts in the U.S. and Britain, and the
role of the community and family members in monitoring extremist behaviors. Through
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this study, Aziz suggested that the use of the Internet and social media provides a sense
of anonymity and secrecy making it difficult for family members, law enforcement, and
other community stakeholders to stem the advance towards radicalization. Aziz also
found that parents were unaware of their children’s involvement in extremist activities in
many homegrown terrorism cases in the U.S. and the United Kingdom.
Mellen (2015) reviewed research related to dissemination of jihadi materials and
propaganda. The analysis suggests that the Internet has facilitated the spreading of such
materials and it facilitates the socialization efforts of terrorist organizations. Mellen also
proposed that extremist recruitment does not rely solely on the Internet, but it is useful in
the initial exposure to information and support networks during the initial stages of the
process that could eventually lead to personal contact
Archetti (2105) proposed a lack of understanding regarding the implications of
the Internet and social media in the radicalization and recruitment of terrorists. Archetti
argued that media itself is not the cause of radicalization; other conditions move
individuals to embrace extremism. According to Archetti, the personal narrative of
individuals must coincide with the group’s narrative in order for the message to be
effective; extremist messages will take hold in individuals who have an affinity towards
that ideology. Archetti’s findings suggest that trying to message radicals is ineffective,
and there should be a concerted effort to reach out to the non-radical members of their
network, who could exert their influence upon them. By focusing on the individual’s
network and through the intercession of key communicators, counter narrative messages
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could be more effective. Archetti’s perspectives are especially important for the
development of effective interventions.
Counterterrorism and Deradicalization
Approaches aimed at reducing the influence of extremist ideologies involve the
development of counter-narratives to deter potential converts from embracing extremist
ideologies and adopting their worldview. These counter-narrative initiatives present a
challenge for the government because it presumes that government officials are able to
differentiate between acceptable and unacceptable ideologies (Bjelopera, 2014a, p. 27).
It would be imprudent to categorize all ideologically similar groups and individuals under
the banner of violent extremists or terrorists. It would be likewise impractical to limit
access to online content in an effort to curtail radicalization. The American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) has argued against censoring access to information through the
Internet in the name of countering extremism. The United States Constitution protects
the freedom of speech of individuals and regardless of its inflammatory nature, extremist
propaganda is not illegal (Bjelopera, 2014a, p. 27).
It is difficult to counter a personal narrative. According to Byman and Shapiro
(2014), counterterrorism experts support the development of counter narratives that
highlight the destructive nature of the jihadist approach. The National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC) collaborated with the World Organization for Resource Development and
Education (WORDE), to develop a community educational campaign to increase
awareness of sources of radicalization (Byman & Shapiro, 2014, p. 24).
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Archetti (2015) suggested that an indirect approach, by educating community
members might yield better results than trying to message directly individuals prone to
radicalization, or already radicalized. Archetti further argued that since they might have
already made up their mind, it would be more effective to influence non-radicalized
members of their relationship network, who have greater credibility and influence to
adjust their identity and narrative (p. 56). Leveraging the influence that close associates,
family members, and local leaders have over personal identity and narrative would be
preferable to efforts that seek to influence behaviors from the “top-down”. Byman and
Shapiro (2014) argued that government agencies and officials are ineffective at
influencing individuals because they do not have credibility at the local level nor do they
understand the community setting. The counterradicalization narrative’s focus should
then leverage local community leaders as the spokespeople, who would focus more on
practical concerns (Byman & Shapiro, 2014, p. 24). As with politics, counterterrorism is
a local affair. Local leaders should be at the forefront of engaging with the people of
their community, rather than an outsider with no local influence (Bjelopera, 2014a, p. 9).
The United States National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) recognized the need
to focus on behaviors, rather than appearance or belonging to specific ethnic or religious
groups to develop effective counterterrorism initiatives (Bjelopera, 2014a, p. 18). This
approach should allow for the development of targeted intervention approaches and
prevent the inappropriate targeting or profiling of groups or individuals. Improper
interventions could lead to a waste of resources and efforts, and the alienation of potential
allies in the counterterrorism effort (Bjelopera, 2014a).
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Dechesne (2011) studied deradicalization programs, argued that these programs
should be a principal effort to counterterrorism, and made four critical observations on
deradicalization efforts. First, counterterrorism efforts should focus less on repressive
means and should include efforts that motivate radicalized individuals to give up violence
and reintegrate into an accepted social construct. Second, deradicalization programs in
the United Kingdom, Italy, and Palestine have been successful in fostering the
reintegration of former extremists into society. Third, radicalized individuals might
spontaneously seek ways to abandon their violent ways as their dissatisfaction grows
concerning their conditions, status, or the apparent lack of progress in their efforts.
Finally, according to Dechesne, deradicalization programs should aim at changing not
just behaviors, but also perspectives towards violence and the acceptability of the cause.
Dechesne’s review of deradicalization programs concluded that efforts to
deradicalize right-wing extremists focused not on changing their thought processes, but
their behavior. Dechesne suggests that there is a lack of understanding of what motivates
individuals to forfeit their radical views; and these programs could benefit from the
application of insights from the field of psychology. Finally, Dechesne recommended
deradicalization approaches that favor self-awareness and honesty, the presentation of
acceptable alternate views, as well as additional research on deradicalization to determine
its effectiveness.
Gad (2012) studied the 2009 Danish government’s radicalization prevention
program. The analysis revealed that the program suffered from a lack of nuance that
differentiated real and perceived threats, empty attempts at developing dialogue among
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dissenting parties, and the labeling of Muslims as threats. Gad found that although the
government tried to address anti-democratic elements in general, most examples of
extremism defined Islamic radicalism, failing to include left or right wing extremist
elements. Gad suggested that because these policies were the product of security-minded
officials, they focused on preventing imminent threats to the State. Some of the concerns
regarding the Danish radicalization prevention program revolved around the reaction it
elicited among those who the State viewed as threats. According to Gad, this approach
created a sense of distrust among the parties of the conflict and did little to develop a
two-way discourse on radicalization, but rather escalated the conflict.
Gad concluded that the purported dialogue was closer to a monologue, with
government officials defining expected behaviors, and providing limited opportunities for
criticism or dissent. Scholars and engaged Muslim leaders were successful in adjusting
the policies by appealing to conflict resolution approaches, yet the official language of
the program falls short of changing the security-minded perspective of the policies, which
could allow for its resurgence with a change of the ruling party. Gad’s study provided
key insights into challenges associated with the development of effective
counterterrorism initiatives by highlighting the unintended consequences of poorly
developed programs.
Dalgaard-Nielsen (2013) studied programs that helped individual militants
disengage or exit from violent Islamist extremist organizations in Europe, South Asia,
and the Middle East. The study encompassed the review of 16 articles and other
publications dating back to 1990, including 216 interviews and supplemental data, and
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included case studies of militants from a broad range of ideologies, from militant Islamist
groups, left wing, as well as right wing extremists. Dalgaard-Nielsen’s analysis shed
light on how creating doubt in the mind of the militant was a useful approach. According
to Dalgaard-Nielsen, the programs in South Asia and the Middle East focused their
efforts on establishing a proper interpretation of the tenets of Islam, which differs
significantly from the views that extremist groups advanced, especially as it related to the
use of violence and the killing of civilians. The European programs featured a greater
focus on economic assistance and efforts to sever ties with the extremist organization,
while purposely steering away from ideological re-education. Through this study,
Dalgaard-Nielsen identified difficulties in assessing the effectiveness of the programs that
would motivate other countries to implement similar programs to their counterterrorism
repertoire.
Dalgaard-Nielsen suggested three common reasons for militants to abandon
extremist groups. First, militants lost faith in the justifications for violence and the
validity of their arguments. The second reason involved the loss of faith in the
organization or its leadership. The last reason revolved around changes in the militant’s
perspective or circumstances that made them question their commitment to the cause of
the extremist group. A common thread among all three reasons was the involvement of
external influences that were able to influence militants’ worldview in a subtle manner,
while capitalizing on their doubts. Dalgaard-Nielsen argued the worthiness of including
exit or disengagement interventions to existing counterterrorism programs.
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Kruglanski, Gelfand, Belanger, Sheveland, Hetiarachchi, and Gunaratna (2014)
studied how the quest for personal significance served as a motivation for adoption of
extremist ideologies. Kruglanski et al. developed a model that considered three
components: motivation to the attainment of the personal significance goal; the means
used to attain significance, which includes the application of violence; and the role that
networks and group dynamics play in the socialization process that leads to the
justification of violence. Kruglanski et al. cited specific examples of deradicalization
programs and argued for continued assessments to determine their effectiveness.
Kruglanski et al. asserted that their model could help in the development of approaches to
stem radicalization and influence deradicalization efforts.
Aly and Striegher suggested that counterterrorism experts should consider
radicalization as a precursor of violence in the pursuit of ideological objectives. It is
critical therefore, to implement strategies that prevent individuals from embracing
extremist views, or counter their beliefs through comprehensive de-radicalization
programs (Aly & Striegher, 2012, p. 850). Alexander (2011) argued the importance of
counter narratives aimed at combating and reducing the influence of extremist
propaganda (p. 478).
According to Costanza (2015), radicalization involves an indoctrination process,
in which the family and community instill upon individuals a set of extremist beliefs and
values. In the absence of an opposing perspective, those beliefs shape the views and
perspectives of individuals, making them more likely to take action to support the narrow
interpretation usually associated with extremist ideologies (Costanza, 2015, p. 1). This
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effort cannot be the sole domain of law enforcement and the federal government. The
efforts of law enforcement officials oftentimes generate mistrust and unwillingness
within the community to cooperate with them because of perceptions of unfairness or
infringement on Constitutional rights and liberties (Bjelopera, 2014a, p. 10). A broad set
of stakeholders must collaborate to counter this indoctrination, including not only the
family, but also civic and social organizations, government and non-governmental
organizations (Costanza, 2015, p. 15).
Decker, Pyrooz, and Moule Jr. (2014) researched the conditions that lead
individuals to leave gangs. Decker et al. interviewed 260 former gang members from
different cities and settings and applied Ebaugh’s role exit theory as the framework to
understand gang disengagement. This theory provides a five-stage model that explains
the process of disengaging from the influence of gangs. Decker et al. found that exiting a
gang involves conflict between competing forces; the gang and the individual’s desire for
a new life. Decker et al. also found that intervention programs, in spite of significant
commitment of resources, had little influence on individuals to leave gangs. Finally,
Decker et al. found that it was difficult to establish the point at which individuals
disengaged from the gang, especially because many former gang members continue to
have ties with their former associates.
Deradicalization efforts throughout the world have shown mixed reviews, but the
existence of such programs highlights the importance that governments place on creative
and holistic approaches to stem the progression of individual radicalization. While the
data suggests that this emerging effort could benefit from continued evaluation, the
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creativity, and persistence showed by its proponents might eventually lead to the
development of comprehensive approach that could prove effective. It would be useful to
consider incorporating these themes in current deradicalization efforts in the U.S.
Empirical Research
Sageman (2014) addressed the need for field-based, empirical research to
overcome the stagnation in the field of radicalization. In spite of the government’s
investment in terrorism research, researchers have been unable to reach consensus on
what motivated individuals to take on ideologically motivated violence. Sageman
advocated for a closer collaboration between intelligence and academic professionals
engaging in a more robust discourse to understand the factors that lead individuals to
embrace terrorism. After analyzing research efforts to understand terrorism and
radicalization, Sageman proposed that most research in the field of terrorism and
radicalization had fallen outside of the academic realm, and that individuals without any
scientific credentials or knowledge dominated the effort. This resulted in a number of
unsubstantiated claims that distorted facts and overshadowed the efforts of true scholars.
Sageman recommended that the government make comprehensive and sensitive data
available so that scholars can use primary data in their research. Absent this information,
research will depend on mostly secondary data and agenda-driven government reports.
Mastors and Siers (2014) conducted a case study of Omar al-Hammami, a U.S.
citizen who joined the terrorist group al-Shabaab in Somalia. Mastors and Siers focused
on aspects of motivation for joining the organization, the indoctrination process, and
group membership dynamics. Mastors and Siers found that al-Hammami’s path to
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radicalization began during his teenage years with the adoption of the Muslim faith and
distancing himself from the moderating influences of friends and family. The most
significant factors associated with his radicalization were the need for adventure and
excitement beyond his life in Alabama, al-Hammami’s desire for personal achievement
and significance, and a difficult relationship with his father. Al-Hammami’s desire for
attention and personal status put him at odds with the al-Shabaab leadership, resulting in
his death. Mastors and Siers concluded that the fragmented nature of radicalization
research has not permitted the necessary integration of relevant concepts, resulting in a
shortage of useful radicalization theories. Mastors and Siers also alluded to the limited
number of existing case studies related to radicalization, recommended a greater
emphasis on empirical research to widen the collective understanding of this
phenomenon and to develop useful theories.
Halverson and Way (2012) conducted a case study of Colleen LaRose, also
known as Jihad Jane. In 2009, federal agents arrested her in connection with her
involvement in a terrorist plot to murder a Swedish cartoonist who depicted the Prophet
Mohammad in a negative light. Halverson and Way’s research suggested that LaRose’s
involvement in terrorism had less to do with an affinity for extremist ideologies, but
rather a combination of individual and environmental factors. According to Halverson
and Way, LaRose did not reach a high school level of education, had a troubled and
abusive upbringing, had a minor criminal record, suffered with alcoholism, and seemed
to have a general contempt for U.S. social norms. These factors might have facilitated
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the adoption of extremist views LaRose encountered in the virtual radical Islamist
community she followed via the Internet.
Halverson and Way’s research revealed that while LaRose never attended Islamic
services at a mosque or showed little knowledge of the precepts of the religion, LaRose
accepted Islam as a way to find meaning and a sense of purpose, and as an alternative to
her existing way of life. This study highlighted how individuals who live within the
margins of society, with little prospects to achieve their potential because of lacking
individual attributes, and who have minimal support networks, could be easy prey for
indoctrination into extremism. Halverson and Way argued that access to the extremist
propaganda would likely not have led to her radicalization.
These studies highlight the importance of empirical, field-based research.
Radicalization research requires an understanding of a myriad of contributing factors,
which are not readily always readily available in the literature. It is important to consider
information from a variety of sources in order to develop a better understanding of the
factors that lead to radicalization. The perspectives of individuals who are most likely to
recognize these indicators can prove invaluable, lending support for the inclusion of local
law enforcement perspectives in radicalization studies.
Homegrown Terrorism
U.S. counterterrorism efforts abroad resulted in the denial of safe havens and
sanctuaries in under governed areas, the targeted assassination of terrorist leaders,
including Osama Bin Ladin, interruption of plans and operations, disruption of
fundraising and recruitment, and impeding travel and communications networks (The
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Heritage Foundation, 2014). The disruption of large-scale terrorist attacks on U.S. soil
since 2001 contrasts however, with an increase in the number of homegrown terrorism
attacks or plots in the United States during that same period (New America, 2017).
Crone and Harrow (2011) conducted a quantitative study to identify changes in
the proportion of homegrown terrorism in Western countries, using a dataset
encompassing 65 acts of terrorism from 1989 to 2008. This dataset included 228
perpetrators, all of whom were Islamist terrorists. The study’s framework consisted of
the assessment of the perpetrators’ degree of autonomy and their level of belonging to
Western societies. Crone and Harrow identified an increase in terrorist incidents in the
West since 2003 in which the perpetrators had a high degree of autonomy from other
terrorist organizations and belonged to the country where the attack took place
(homegrown terrorists). Crone and Harrow theorized that while they observed an
increase in the number of autonomous and internal terrorist attacks, this trend would
eventually subside when terrorist organization are able to reestablish the networks that
counterterrorism actions severed. Other research suggests however, that the increase in
homegrown terrorism might be a natural progression in the evolution of terrorism based
on Al Qaeda’s transition to a less centralized command and control approach and their
shift to inspiring a global jihadi movement (Mendelsohn, 2011; Brinkley, 2013; Rudner,
2013).
Bjelopera (2013) conducted a comprehensive analysis of homegrown terrorist
plots and attacks against the U.S. from 2001 to 2013 and addressed the radicalization
process and challenges that US counterterroism efforts face in trying to prevent these
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attacks. Bjelopera’s overview of the threat and government efforts to identify and thwart
terrorist plots and attacks provides valuable context to understand the complexity of the
problem. Bjelopera also provided important insights into the various radicalization
trends, illustrating the difficulty of generalizing on any aspects of this problem. Finally,
Bjelopera recommended stronger collaboration between government counterterrorism
and community organizations.
Bergen, Hoffman, and Tiedemann (2011) analyzed Al Qaeda’s threat to U.S.
security based on interviews with counterterrorism officials at various levels of
government, as well as members of law enforcement, intelligence, and policy arenas.
Bergen et al. discussed AQ’s strengths, weaknesses, emerging trends in their operational
approach, and posited that the inclusiveness of U.S. society would no longer insulate the
country from jihadi recruitment and radicalization at home. Bergen et al. suggested a
future increase in the number of individuals radicalized and recruited on U.S. soil
carrying out most terrorist attacks. Current reports on terrorist incidents in the U.S.
provide credibility to their projections. As of 2015, the Heritage Foundation reported 73
Islamist terrorist plots or attacks in the United States since 2001. Of those attacks, 62
(85%) were the efforts of homegrown terrorists (Inserra, 2015a). A more comprehensive
and updated database of terrorist attacks in the United States reveals that since 2001,
there have been 214 homegrown terrorist plots or attacks. Of this total, 194 (89%) were
jihadi inspired, while the balance were the efforts of right or left wing leaning individuals
(New America, 2017).
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Since 2001, there have been 135 non-Islamist homegrown terrorist plots in the
United States (Muslim Public Affairs Council, 2012). Between 1977 and 2011,
antiabortionists have killed eight people, attempted the murder of another 17 individuals,
and carried out 175 acts of arson. Between 1990 and 2010, right wing extremists were
responsible for the death of 145 individuals (Loadenthal, 2013). Regardless of the
ideology that drives their motivation to commit acts of terrorism, the data suggests that
the threat of homegrown terrorism is real.
Borum (2011), Zuckerman, Bucci, and Carafano (2013), and Mantri (2011),
assessed that homegrown terrorism represents a significant threat to domestic security.
This trend seems consistent with terrorist organizations’ desire to inspire terrorist attacks
on U.S. soil. Homegrown terrorists can overcome law enforcement surveillance because
they do not stand out and can effectively hide in plain sight, and because of the simplicity
of their plans and methods, which require less coordination and communication,
increasing their probability of success (Bjelopera, 2014b, p. 1). Within the U.S., local
law enforcement officials assessed that Neo-Nazis, militias, White supremacists, and
sovereign citizen movements represented greater threats to their jurisdiction than Islamist
inspired terrorists (Muslim Public Affairs Council, 2012).
Brooks (2011) assessed U.S. Muslim homegrown terrorism and downplayed this
threat by referring to the low quality of online content, cultural and language barriers that
could prevent the translation of concepts to local audiences, and the difficulty in
obtaining bomb-making materials. Brooks also suggested that individuals seeking to
travel abroad to join terrorist organizations would find it difficult to do so because of
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strict security measures, their inability to connect with jihadi networks, and the
unwillingness of terrorist organizations to admit westerners because of the security risks
they represent. Recent trends however, challenge these assertions.
Ramsay and Marsden (2015) studied 30 Islamist-inspired terrorist attacks from
2001 to 2013 in the U.S. and other Western countries in terms of the selection of targets.
Ramsay and Marsden’s study revealed a preponderance of targets within three categories:
critical infrastructure (strategic and economic targets), sources of government and
political influence, and large gatherings of civilians to achieve mass casualties. Ramsay
and Marsden suggested that followers of leaderless jihad, or homegrown terrorists, have
become more selective in the selection of their targets and that future attacks would likely
seek to achieve greater impact by improving the quality of their efforts rather than
quantity. Ultimately, the goal of the jihadi movement is to bring about a global
Caliphate, and the actions of individual independent, unaffiliated actors are a means to
the end. Ramsay and Marsden proposed that that although the number of Al Qaeda- and
ISIS- inspired attacks might not be large, their strategic implications might be significant.
Schultz (2014) proposed that ISIS has appealed to its supporters to perform acts
of terrorism in western countries in retribution for their involvement in the coalition
fighting them in Iraq and Syria. This exhortation seems consistent with the attempt to
mobilize forces to engage in terrorism in a global scale. Schultz suggested that the war in
Syria and Iraq provided an opportunity for foreign fighters to join Al Qaeda, its affiliates,
or ISIS. In spite of government efforts to develop narratives that counter extremist
recruiting propaganda, ISIS has been successful in inciting over 19,000 recruits from 90
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countries to travel to Syria and Iraq to join their ranks (Garamone, 2015). An estimated
15% of these individuals proceeded from western nations (Cragin, 2015).
Taylor and Tisdale (2015) proposed that western foreign fighters represent a
significant threat to the U.S. and other western nations. First, western foreign fighters
represent a significant source of human capital that jihadist groups require to carry out
their operations. When western foreign fighters return to their home countries, these
fighters would have acquired the skills needed to plan and conduct attacks and would
have developed associations with jihadist networks abroad that could enable them to
create local extremist networks to expand their operations on the domestic front. Taylor
and Tisdale also suggested that western foreign fighters could also represent a source of
inspiration for local sympathizers, which they would engage through jihadi-sponsored
websites and use their cultural knowledge to radicalize them or elicit their support in
planning or committing acts of terrorism in their home country.
Inserra and Phillips (2015) reported the existence of an Al Qaeda cell in Syria, of
veteran terrorists to recruit and train Western foreign fighters to conduct terrorist attacks
in their home countries. This unit demonstrated significant interest in recruiting fighters
with U.S. passports to support their efforts. Inserra and Phillips also reported that in
February 2015, U.S. federal law enforcement agents arrested a naturalized U.S. citizen,
born in Somalia, on charges of traveling to Syria, receiving terrorist training, and
returning to the U.S. to carry out terrorist acts against U.S. soldiers at the behest of ISIS.
The ensuing investigation revealed that this was the first western foreign fighter to return
to the U.S. with orders to engage in terrorism (Inserra & Phillips, 2015).
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Hinkkainen (2013) studied the similarities between homegrown terrorism and
domestic and international terrorism that could inform counterterrorism efforts.
Hinkkainen’s research considered the way in which the different terrorist groups seek to
influence specific audiences in pursuit of their objectives. Hinkkainen focused on
separatists, leftists, right wing, international and homegrown terrorism groups. The
findings of Hinkkainen’s study suggest that domestic and homegrown terrorism share
features such as target selection logic, propensity, and methods. Hinkkainen proposed
that effective counterterrorism efforts should focus on these criteria. Of particular
interest is the Hinkkainen’s position that terrorist groups do not target constituencies that
conform to their views; terrorist groups target other groups that they perceive as having
antagonistic views to their own.
Loadenthal (2013) researched how States developed their counterterrorism
approaches to address the threat of ecological driven terrorist groups, such as the Animal
Liberation Front and Earth Liberation Front. Loadenthal argued that these efforts
focused solely on the prevention of attacks and preservation of property, rather than an
inclusive agenda that considers conflict resolution approaches through the introduction of
measures to imbue the process with justice, dignity, and adequate representation.
Jones and Morales (2012) reviewed Philippine government efforts to deradicalize
inmates convicted of terrorism charges. Jones and Morales were interested in
determining how prisoner involvement with prison gangs affected their extremist belief
system. The Philippine deradicalization program is a comprehensive effort that includes
education for staff, prison reforms, improvement of ongoing programs, and vocational
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training and educational opportunities. Jones and Morales also reviewed deradicalization
efforts in other countries, some from Arab countries, and others from Western regions.
Jones and Morales proposed that most deradicalization programs feature efforts for
individuals to disengage physically and psychological from extremist influences. Jones
and Morales acknowledged difficulties in the implementation and assessing the
effectiveness of these programs. Finally, Jones and Morales also recognized that there is
little consensus on how to approach prison deradicalization, and that seemingly effective
programs might not be transferable to all settings and countries.
Conversion Theory
Ferguson and Binks (2015) argued that radicalization processes share similarities
with religious conversion and suggested that the use of a religious conversion model
could be useful in understanding the concept (p. 26). This led to the selection of the
Religious Conversion Theory to frame this study. Rambo (1993) postulated that in order
to comprehend radicalization, researchers must understand the individuals’ environment
(context), their loss of emotional or moral balance resulting from a traumatic episode
(crisis), their desire to regain the lost balance (quest), and the emergence of a guide or
advocate to assist in the quest for balance (encounter). The strengthening of the
relationship with the advocate or guide and the introduction of a new ideology
(interaction) leads to the individual’s conscious decision to embrace the new ideology
(commitment). The final stage concerns the outcomes from this commitment
(consequences). Figure 1 illustrates the progression along the stages of conversion,
adapted to address the radicalization process. The stages appear sequentially for
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illustrative purposes only; their positioning does not imply that radicalization must follow
that specific order.
Figure 1 Radicalization Stages

Regardless of the extent to which homegrown terrorists experience each stage and
how deeply they commit to radical ideologies, this model should assist in understanding
the progressive nature of their radicalization and help identify areas in which key
stakeholders might be able to intervene and disrupt the process. The inclusion in the
Conversion Theory of aspects of radicalization research, psychology, religious studies,
and conflict studies makes it a valuable holistic approach for developing an
understanding of the radicalization process of U.S. homegrown terrorists.
Borum (2011) studied theories of extremism and radicalization, as well as the
nature of radicalization within the context of processes. Most radicalization-related
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theories attempt to explain this phenomenon from a social science perspective. Borum
proposed a multi-disciplinary framework for understanding how individuals embrace
terrorism. He noted that the reinforcing nature of the conversion stages could help
explain the radicalization of Islamist extremists since 2001.
Kahn and Greene (2004) conducted a quantitative study to determine if the seven
stages were apparent in the participants experiencing religious conversion. Kahn and
Greene found strong evidence for the relevance of six of the stages, except context and
suggested that the complexity of each individual’s background made quantification of
this dimension difficult for their study. According to Kahn and Greene, the complexity
of the context, which includes individual and social settings of potential terrorists, further
supports the need to understand how these factors contribute to radicalization.
Meyer (2013) referred to the conversion theory to illustrate that conversion is
progressive in nature rather than an instantaneous occurrence, and compared how
neurological factors affected progressive and instantaneous religious conversion,
postulating that the conversion process appeared to restore a sense of well-being to
individuals who experienced distressing events in their lives. This renewed sense of
purpose is consistent with the quest stage of the conversion theory, in which individuals
seek resolution of a crisis, and leads to an encounter with an agent of change, be it a
person, groups, or ideology.
Paloutzian, Richardson, and Rambo (1999) assessed how conversion affected the
personality of the convert and how some individuals are more predisposed (because of
their personality) to convert. Paloutzian et al. argued that conversion, rather than
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occurring in a vacuum, it involves a close interaction of historical, cultural,
psychological, and social contexts. Paloutzian et al suggested the use of a holistic model
that incorporates perspectives from various disciplines and sources to place radicalization
within a real-world context, beyond of the confines of theoretical discourse.
Oppenheim, Steele, Vargas, and Weintraub (2014) researched why individuals
joined insurgent groups, why some remained loyal to the group, and why others defected.
Oppenheim et al. found that consistent with the commitment stage of the conversion
theory, defectors were more likely to acknowledge their past actions, regardless of how
regrettable these actions might be as part of their submission to their newfound
worldview. The new group’s acceptance of the member’s past contributed to a greater
commitment to the group’s organizational objectives, and an abrogation of their previous
groups’ goals. Oppenheim et al. concluded that individuals were more apt to defect the
insurgent organization when it deviated from their ideological foundation. These insights
should apply to terrorist organizations as well and are important for the development of
counterterrorism initiatives that could focus on reintegration of formerly radicalized
individuals into the mainstream society.
Gangs
Decker and Pyrooz (2015) studied gang-related radicalization, and they
acknowledged that there are marked differences between the motivations of gang
members and terrorists. Decker and Pyrooz suggested that gangs do not necessarily have
religious or political motivations, they and focus more on local efforts; terrorist actions
have ideological underpinnings, and their actions have international aspects. Decker and
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Pyrooz argued that both groups coincide in key areas, which make comparative research
attractive as it might yield better understanding of extremism and radicalization. Gangs
and extremist groups are hard-to-reach populations, with a membership consisting of
mostly young males; gang actions victimize and harm the communities where they act,
and these actions are usually disproportionate to the real or perceived affronts that justify
them; and finally, both groups share similarities in their socialization processes,
mobilization, and use of violence (Decker & Pyrooz, 2015).
Decker and Pyrooz also identified 12 principles based on an analysis of gang
research that could also apply to terrorist or radicalized groups and postulated that there
are also aspects of terrorism and extremism research that could inform the understanding
of gang dynamics. Accordingly, Decker and Pyrooz suggested that a triangulation of
ideas and methods related to both gang and extremist research could yield improved
validity and reliability, and proposed several approaches that could benefit an
understanding of both groups. Given the similar social aspects related to belonging to
gangs and extremist groups, an understanding of disengagement strategies could be
beneficial across the board. In addition, Decker and Pyrooz stressed the importance of
assessing the efficacy of engagement programs to avoid investing limited capital in
programs with questionable success records. Both groups show parallels between
membership and behaviors, but although membership in gangs results in an increase in
violent behaviors, it does not establish causality, in that belonging to a gang does not
make individuals criminals and that not all criminals belong to gangs. Borum (as cited in
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Kleinmann, 2012, p. 282) made a similar assessment related to extremism and terrorism;
espousing one view one does not necessarily cause the other.
Simi, Windisch, and Sporer (2016) conducted a research project focused on
violent extremism, the influence of early year trauma, adolescent delinquency, and
potential risks factors on extremist engagement. Simi et al. uncovered that individuals
manifested a variety of motivations for involvement in violent extremism, such as peer
pressure, attraction to the group’s reputation, and improvement of their personal level of
significance. Simi et al. found that participants in the study expressed that other
motivations for joining extremist groups included protection from school bullying and
other gangs in their community and suggested that individuals who join extremist
movements do so for the same reasons they would join criminal gangs. Research into
gang involvement is not different from extremist engagement, lending credence to the
value of considering both events as related and that understanding the dynamics of one
choice sheds light on the other. The complexity of gang life and violent extremism
require innovative approaches to uncover the factors that influence their recruitment and
radicalization efforts.
Alleyne, Fernandes, and Pritchard (2014) researched how gang members use
moral disengagement (through the application of moral justification, euphemistic
language, advantageous comparison, displacement of responsibility, attribution of blame,
and dehumanization) as a socializing strategy to engage in violence. Alleyne et al. sought
to understand the mechanisms that allow young gang members to engage in violent
behavior and suggested that gang violence is a function of the gang’s collective identity
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and threats to its identity and that gang values and mores override social values; yet, it is
not clear how this happens. Alleyne et al. examined the relationship between gang
membership and violent criminal behavior through the exploration of sociocognitive
mechanisms. Prior researchers considered current theories of moral disengagement, such
as Bandura’s (1986) social cognitive theory, which explains social and antisocial
behavior. Bandura argued that individuals develop the moral agencies that inhibit
inhuman behavior and facilitate humanity; however, in order to overcome conflicts in the
presence of immoral behavior, they apply moral disengagement techniques, such as
moral justification, euphemistic labels, advantageous comparison, diffusion of
responsibility, displacement of responsibility, distortion of consequences, and
dehumanization.
Through a comparison of young gang members to nongang members, Alleyne et
al. sought to test how much moral disengagement mechanisms facilitate violence.
Alleyne et al. revealed that gang members had a significantly higher propensity than
nongang members did to engage in moral justification, euphemistic language,
advantageous comparison, displacement of responsibility, and dehumanization. Alleyne
et al. suggested that gang membership leads to the dehumanization of others (nongang
members), facilitating the application of violence and argued that the purpose of moral
disengagement was not to justify violence, but to shield its members from cognitive
dissonance. Moral disengagement is applicable to gang violence as well as radical
extremism.
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Smith, Rush, and Burton (2013) analyzed research related to gangs, organized
crime organizations, and terrorist groups to understand their similarities and
distinguishing characteristics and found that although their composition and goals might
differ, they share other characteristics, such as recruitment techniques and engaging in
criminal activity to support and fund their efforts. Smith et al. concluded that the
similarities and potential influence of one of these organizations upon the others justifies
the need to develop a better understanding of their composition and methods in order to
develop appropriate intervention efforts.
Scott (2014) studied youth gang membership within the California youth
corrections system. Interviews with institutionalized individuals revealed that gang
membership has correlates to more pronounced violent behaviors, as compared to nongang members. Scott proposed that important variables associated with gang-related
violence are the length of membership and previous membership in institutional gangs.
Scott recommended the implementation of strategies aimed at treating violent behaviors,
while considering groups processes. Scott also recommended that intervention
approaches should also consider efforts to sever gang ties in order to reduce the
propensity for engagement in violent or criminal behavior.
Summary and Transition
Any effort to understand and counter radicalization requires an understanding of
its mechanisms and the many factors that influence it. Not every extremist becomes a
terrorist; exposure to extremist ideology will not necessarily result in the radicalization of
the masses. Research suggests that individuals must be receptive to the message because
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it is consistent with their narrative and worldview. In spite of the ongoing research on
radicalization, the path to radicalization is still elusive, as are the influence of individual
and social factors. Likewise, the role of the Internet and social media on the
radicalization requires further research. Ongoing gang research into their recruitment and
socialization practices suggests affinity with broader extremist and terrorist movements,
justifying its consideration as a complementary source of knowledge for understanding
radicalization. Current research also lacks sufficient empirical findings as well as a
comprehensive model for understanding radicalization.
This study could contribute to the body of knowledge of radicalization research
by providing empirical data from the case study involving key stakeholder perspectives
on the radicalization process of U.S. homegrown terrorists. The inclusion in the
conversion theory of research involving radicalization, psychology, religious studies, and
conflict studies makes it a valuable holistic approach for developing an understanding of
the radicalization process of U.S. homegrown terrorists. By addressing this knowledge
gap, the findings could help develop meaningful and effective interventions to counter
the appeal of extremist organizations or ideologies and stunt the rising trend of
homegrown terrorism.

59
Chapter 3: Research Method
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to derive empirical data that could
shed a better understanding of the process that leads to the radicalization of U.S.
homegrown terrorists based on interviews with local law enforcement officials, state and
federal counterterrorism officers, and military AT officers from locations in Eastern
North Carolina, as well as current radicalization research. The review of the literature
yielded a number of gaps in the understanding of radicalization. They include the
inability to establish a path to radicalization (Alexander, 2011), how individual and social
factors influence radicalization (Kleinmann, 2012), the mediating effect of the Internet
and social media on radicalization, (Archetti, 2015), a shortfall in empirical research on
radicalization (Mastors & Siers, 2014), and the absence of a comprehensive model for
analyzing radicalization (Ferguson & Binks, 2015). In this study sought to answer the
following research questions:
Q1: What individual and environmental factors contribute to the radicalization of
U.S. homegrown terrorists?
Q2: What form of intervention would be effective to curtail radicalization?
Q3: How would a modification of the conversion theory serve to explain the
radicalization of U.S. homegrown terrorists?
This chapter will include a detailed explanation of the methodology for the study.
I will explain the design and justification for the research approach, the role of the
researcher, and mitigation of bias. In this section, I will include a more in-depth
explanation of the methodology, sampling, participant selection, instrumentation, and
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interview protocol. Another key topic is data collection and analysis, including
trustworthiness and validity. In the closing section, I will address ethical matters in the
execution of the study.
Research Design and Rationale
Case study research is used to develop an in-depth understanding of a
contemporary phenomenon (Yin, 2014), which, in this case, was the radicalization of
U.S. homegrown terrorists from the perspective of individuals who are familiar with the
phenomenon. This approach involves the analysis of an actual event or person, and it
provides empirical data that could inform the development of relevant theories or
interventions (Mastors & Siers, 2014, p. 386). Furthermore, a case study allowed for the
application of the conversion theory by comparing it to the perspectives of the individuals
who are more likely to identify radicalization in the community and would be the first to
intervene to prevent terrorist plots and attacks. Finally, Silke (as cited in Chermak &
Gruenwald, 2015) argued that rather than gathering original data in the field, many
researchers tend to rely on literature reviews to develop an understanding of terrorism (p.
134).
Role of the Researcher
Researchers should be clear on their role in a study because it can affect the
credibility of their findings (Unluer, 2012, p. 1). They could potentially fall into one of
four categories: participant, participant-observer, observer-participant, or observer (Yin,
2011, p. 122). Researchers could also assume the role of interviewer in situations in
which observation, participation, or a combination of both is not feasible. Interviews

61
provide context and differing perspectives to the subject under investigation (Maxwell,
2013, p. 88). Ultimately, the role of the researcher depends on the purpose of the study.
For this qualitative case study, I took on the role of interviewer because it was the most
effective approach for gathering data from knowledgeable participants. Other roles, such
as participant, observer, or a combination of both would not have facilitated the gathering
of relevant data.
I had no formal relationship with the study participants. My role as member of
the armed forces provided some form of indirect kinship because of the role of the
military in combating terrorism, but did not provide any authority over the participants.
Regarding military AT officers, although they are members of the armed forces, I had no
authority over them. As the sole researcher and interviewer, there was a potential for my
personal views and bias to influence data gathering and analysis (Yin, 2011, p. 146).
Researcher Bias
As a member of the U.S. Army, I have personal views and perspectives regarding
terrorism and the threat that homegrown terrorists represent to national security. The
widespread reporting of terrorist acts and plots in the United States influence the manner
in which I view this phenomenon, and it was a significant motivator for me to enter into
this field of study and to frame my research. To reduce the influence of my views on the
matter, I remained vigilant in preventing my bias from skewing data collection
approaches and analysis. It was important that I remain objective and instill a high
degree of integrity to the process. As a qualitative researcher, I strived to practice
inductive learning, to ensure that the findings represented the emerging data rather than
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my personal perspective. Additionally, remaining neutral and objective assured the
objectivity or confirmability of the research. The research approach was clear and
transparent, allowing its replication. I stored the raw data and analysis for additional
review. Finally, I reminded myself that it is through a rigorous examination of the data
and objective presentation of the findings that I would be able to contribute to the
advancement of knowledge in the field of radicalization.
I did not foresee any ethical issues to arise during this study because of conflicts
of interest or power differentials or the interaction with protected populations. The
participants worked for law enforcement agencies and other military organizations, so
there was no professional relationship between the participants and myself. Participation
in this research did not involve the use of incentives, and the participants were able to
withdraw from the study at any time.
Methodology
In this qualitative case study, I sought to develop empirical data that can lead to a
better understanding of the radicalization of U.S. homegrown terrorists, based on
interviews with local law enforcement officials, state and federal counterterrorism
officers, and military AT officers from locations in Eastern North Carolina, as well as
current radicalization research. The analysis of data from interviews helped me to
develop trends and patterns associated with the radicalization process within the
framework of the conversion theory. The findings could lead to the development of a
useful model for understanding radicalization and the development of appropriate
intervention approaches based on empirical data.
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Sampling
The planned study population for this study was a purposive sample of officers
from local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies from cities across Eastern North
Carolina and AT officers from three military installations in the region. This area of
North Carolina is important, both regionally and nationally. It is home to the Research
Triangle Park and three major military installations. Law enforcement officials from the
cities of Goldsboro, Fayetteville, and Jacksonville should be prepared to identify
potential threats to their safety, including homegrown terrorists. AT officers and security
personnel from military installations in the region should also understand indicators of
radicalization and terrorist threats.
Researchers use purposive sampling to seek participants who can contribute to a
deeper understanding of the phenomenon under investigation because of their in-depth
knowledge and experience in the matter (Rudestam & Newton, 2015, p. 123). Law
enforcement officials are usually more familiar with their operational environment and
are better qualified to recognize indicators and warnings of potential threats (Brooks,
2011) and radicalization activities in the community (Connors, 2009, p. 243). Although
the goal was to interview 26 participants, data saturation is a function of data quality and
richness, not a number of interviews. For this study, it was more important to have
participants with experience that would allow them to provide informed insights than to
have a large sample size.
Qualitative research usually involves a smaller sample as compared to
quantitative research, which allows for greater depth of analysis rather than statistical
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significance (Miles et al., 2014, p. 31). Case studies require the selection of purposeful
sampling units to generate sufficient content-rich data. There are not absolute approaches
in determining sampling sizes in qualitative case study research, so decisions on sampling
depend on the research question and depth of the participants’ understanding of the
phenomenon (Miles et al., 2014, p. 30).
Researchers must balance quantity and quality of data, addressing the potential of
diluted analysis, failure to reach saturation of data, or the generation of too much data,
that could make analysis unmanageable. I wanted interviews with 26 participants, which
would help generate sufficient data to develop themes and patterns on the factors that
influence the radicalization of homegrown terrorists. The total number of participants
was 23, which satisfied data collection efforts and helped reach data saturation.
Saturation regards the point in a study in which data collection no longer yields additional
perspectives or after the full development and validation of themes and patterns (Yin,
2014, p. 125).
Participant Selection, Contact, and Recruitment
Qualitative researchers collecting data through interviews should be prepared to
define their sample population, select the suitable sample size for their study, determine
an appropriate sampling strategy, and establish the approach for recruiting participants
(Robinson, 2014, p. 25). Participant identification and recruiting began by contacting the
police departments in Goldsboro, Fayetteville, and Jacksonville and requesting their
participation in the study. When the respective agency responded affirmatively on
participating in the study, and after identifying potential participants, each one received
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an e-mail invitation to participate in the study, which included the informed consent
form, the scope, and purpose of the research, as well as measures to ensure the
confidentiality and anonymity of participants. Another useful participant recruitment
approach for this case study was the use of snowball sampling. This approach involves
adding participants to the sample population based on the recommendations of other
participants. It is important that this approach be purposeful, rather than convenience
based (Yin, 2011, p. 89). The size of the organizations that supported the study allowed
for the use of snowball sampling as the main approach, based on the recommendation of
the organization’s leadership. This ensured that participants met the qualifications for
inclusion in the study.
The recruitment from state law enforcement agencies followed a similar
approach. Recruitment of military AT officers and security personnel involved
contacting each installation garrison commander and requesting authorization for
inclusion in the study. In addition to Walden’s Institutional Review Board (IRB)
approval, it was important to identify any requirements that each organization might have
to ensure the ethical performance of research with their personnel. This entailed approval
from the Department of the Army and Air Force Human Research Protections Office
(AHRPO). This was important for recruiting participants from military installations
because each military service has an IRB process.
Instrumentation
Protocols for qualitative research should have broad but specific questions that
help guide the line of inquiry and a framework that permits the discovery of confirming
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and disconfirming data. The protocol should allow the researcher to triangulate the data
and enhance the discovery of new insights (Yin, 2011, pp. 103-104). Interviews
containing open-ended questions should yield insights and fidelity (Rudestam & Newton,
2015, p. 130). Data collection for this study included a researcher-developed
questionnaire that allowed the participants to share their perspectives on the process that
contributes to the radicalization of U.S. homegrown terrorists. The use of a standardized,
open-ended interview protocol helped me to focus the interviews and facilitate data
analysis by comparing emerging themes and patterns. The main concern as a qualitative
researcher was the collection of sufficient data for the study.
Interview Protocol
The interview protocol questions related directly to the main research questions.
This aligned the instrument with the study’s purpose and theoretical framework. This
approach satisfied the collection of sufficient data to satisfy the inquiry by reaching data
saturation (Simmons-Mackie & Lynch, 2013, p. 1287). The preliminary plan called for a
single interview, which was conversational in nature. Although the questions provided a
framework for data collection, the interview required additional prompts or follow-up
questions to develop a full understanding of the participants’ perspective on the study
subject. The interviews took place at the individual’s place of work, at an office or
conference room with privacy, free of distractions that provided a comfortable, familiar
setting for the participants. Before the interviews, each participant stated that he or she
understood his or her right to refuse to participate in the study or answer any question that
he or she felt was inappropriate.
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The researcher-developed interview protocol consisted of 10 questions that were
used to understand the participants’ perspectives on the radicalization of U.S. homegrown
terrorists. The appendix contains a copy of the interview protocol. The questions were
as follows:
1. Describe your counterterrorism training and any experiences with terrorism in the
field.
2. How would you define homegrown terrorism? In your view, which group
represents the most significant homegrown terrorism threat?
3. What individual factors (education, financial, social standing, family) might make
an individual susceptible to radicalization?
4. What environmental factors (family, friends, associations) might make an
individual susceptible to radicalization?
5. What type of event might cause an individual to embrace extremism?
6. How do radicalized individuals encounter extremist propaganda?
7. What would be an effective approach to counter extremist propaganda?
8. At what point of the radicalization process are individuals past the point of
effective intervention?
9. Is there anything you would like to add that might be useful in understanding the
radicalization of U.S. homegrown terrorists?
10. Do you know of anyone else who might be able to provide more information on
radicalization?
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The interview protocol questions were consistent with themes from the literature
review, which helped me to integrate the conversion theory into the study. The questions
addressed issues regarding individual factors that influence radicalization (establish
context and crisis from the conversion theory). Other areas include encounters with
extremism (determine encounter and interaction from the conversion theory and influence
of the Internet in radicalization), the development of counter narratives, as well as the
best approach and timing to influence individuals at risk for radicalization
(counterterrorism themes, deradicalization, and commitment from the conversion theory).
The research called for a pilot study with at least five counterterrorism specialists
from locations other than the data collection sites to avoid influencing participants’
answers. Pilot study participant identification and recruiting began by contacting
counterterrorism specialists from the Joint Special Operations University and National
Defense University, and requesting their participation in the study. This effort was
unsuccessful, so the study proceeded without a pilot study. Although the lack of a pilot
test could have increased risks in terms of the validity of the instrument, nesting the
interviews questions with the research questions and the theoretical framework was
sufficient to ensure the questions were appropriate. Furthermore, the theoretical
framework provided preliminary codes for data analysis. By embedding the instrument
with the study’s theoretical framework, it had the sufficiency required for data collection.
Validity
The validity of a study refers to the proper collection and analysis of data so that
the findings are an accurate representation of the phenomenon under study (Yin, 2011, p.
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78). In qualitative research, the use of a multiple case study approach lends confidence to
its findings. Being able to replicate the findings among various cases increases their
validity and trustworthiness (Miles et al., 2014, pp. 33-34). Data collection involved
participants from different organizations, geographies, and jurisdictions, thus
incorporating the perspectives of more than one source, which strengthens the reliability
and validity of the research through triangulation (Miles et al., 2014, pp. 312-313).
Another method that strengthens the confidence of findings is the inclusion of different
perspectives, such as validating or nullifying cases, extreme, and deviant cases (Miles et
al., 2014, p. 32).
Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection Procedures
As the sole investigator for this study, I conducted the data collection and
analysis. Each participant provided one interview, which lasted approximately 60
minutes. This approach was consistent with shorter case studies, in which the researcher
relies on open-ended questions and a more conversational approach to interviewing the
participants (Yin, 2014, p. 111).
Researchers should record the interviews, at a minimum, with an audio recorder,
but should strive to record it with a video recorder. The analysis of the data should
extend beyond the spoken word, and it should consider pauses, emphasis of certain
words, and body language (Yin, 2011, p. 5). For this study, each interview was recorded,
which enabled accurate transcription.
The recruitment plan for this study considered the number of participants by
organization, geography, and jurisdiction in order to meet the planned sample size. It
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was evident that not all members of the partner organizations met the qualifications for
inclusion in the study, so the organization’s leadership identified and coordinated with its
members for the interviews. The study also considered participants from other locations
not from the initial potential sample pool. While the goal was to interview 26
participants, data saturation is a function of data quality and richness, not number of
interviews. For this study, it was more important to have participants with experience
that would allow them to provide informed insights than to have a large sample size.
After finalizing the interviews, it was important to provide a feeling of closure to
the participants. The exiting process was also a valuable opportunity to uncover
additional information that did not surface during the interview. This also allows
participants to have the last word (Yin, 2014, p. 140). The exit approach also included a
reassertion of the confidentiality of the interview and a discussion of the participant’s
availability for any follow-on interviews. Finally, each participant was thanked for their
role in advancing knowledge in the field of radicalization and offered them, as well as the
partner organization an opportunity to receive an abstract of the study once completed, or
a presentation of findings and recommendations.
Data Analysis
Qualitative inquiry can generate a large amount of data from a variety of sources,
such as interviews, documents, records, and media. Depending on the volume and the
variety of sources, analysis can become a daunting process. There is more than one
coding method, each with a particular purpose.
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Regardless of the research design, qualitative researchers should articulate the
problem, establish the purpose of the study, and then develop questions that enable them
to collect data that capture the essence of the problem from the perspective of those who
experienced it. Unlike quantitative research, qualitative inquiry usually has a central
question from which other questions evolve (Rudestam & Newton, 2015, pp. 87-88).
The arrangement of a problem statement grounded in the literature informs the line of
questioning, thus preventing a disjointed approach in the study. For this study, the
suggested gap in the literature helped develop the main research question: what are the
factors that influence the radicalization of U.S. homegrown terrorists.
Qualitative approaches do not have a set approach for data analysis, so
researchers decide on their method base on their experience and the purpose of the study.
The basic qualitative analysis methods are memo writing, categorizing by themes
(coding), and connecting strategies (Maxwell, 2013, p. 105). This study relied on coding
for analyzing the data, employing content directed coding using the broad categories of
the conversion theory to develop initial code categories. This led to first cycle coding,
specifically using In Vivo coding, in which codes key phrases or words from the raw data
helped visualize the emergence of themes and patterns. This approach is suitable for less
experienced researchers and for studies that emphasize participant’s words and
perspectives. The next step was second cycle coding to identify emerging patterns and
themes (Miles et al., 2014). Second cycle coding involves reassembling of the codes or
labels into clusters or themes, followed by the interpretation and drawing conclusions
(Yin, 2011, p. 176).
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Data analysis benefited from qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS),
specifically Atlas TI, version 7. This software assisted with data storage and access,
tracking of completed and ongoing analysis, and retention of records at the completion of
the study. Atlas TI also helps condense transcribed field notes and compare them during
the coding process. It also displays codes and data in graphic form, which is helpful for
organizing data when conducting longitudinal or multi-site studies. This Windows-based
application helps organize non-numeric data, such as interviews, field observations,
literature reviews, Internet content, surveys, and audiovisual files. It also helps identify
subtle relationships among the emerging concepts and themes. (Miles et al., 2014, p.
182). Data was stored the data on an external hard drive, which has password and
encryption protection.
The analysis process requires a deliberate approach to gain the acceptance of the
study’s findings. This includes a continuous checking of the data, a thorough assessment
of the analysis to ensure its comprehensiveness, and the recognition of any biases that
could cloud the interpretation of the data (Yin, 2011, p. 177). It is also essential to seek
any rival explanations, or discrepant cases, that could provide rival explanations for the
findings. This involves an iterative review of assumptions, an assessment of participants’
responses to questions in order to rule out reflexivity, and a review of the data to ensure it
is a true representation of reality, not the researcher’s interpretation (Yin, 2011, p. 80).
Case study researchers should seek to understand the participant’s perspective while
minimizing their intervention in the process outside of the collection of data (Unluer,
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2012, p. 9). Scholarly research requires transparency and clarity that strengthens it
trustworthiness.
Trustworthiness
Qualitative research provides rich and valuable insights that help understand
events and phenomena from the perspective of those who experience them. This
methodology does not have the controls common with quantitative inquiry, which limit
the influence of researchers and participants. Qualitative researchers should strive to
imbue their studies with credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability to
improve the acceptance of their findings among the scholarly community.
Researchers should establish high levels of validity and reliability that clearly
demonstrates the value of their empirical findings if they want to contribute to solving
social problems. A possible threat to validity involves in the introduction of researcher
bias into the findings by interpreting the data according a particular paradigm or
perspective (Maxwell, 2013, p. 124). Researchers should focus on establishing that their
findings are a true representation of the data, by clarifying participant perspectives,
maintaining accurate records, and through triangulation (Rudestam & Newton, 2015, pp.
131-132). Another approach to ensure the validity of the findings is to consider
alternative explanations for the observed phenomena. Researchers should not ignore
discrepant data; they should include it in their discussion and findings even if it does not
support their conclusions (Miles et al., 2014, p. 313).
The various sources of information provided triangulation through the
incorporation of various perspectives and source on the issue and improved the reliability
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and validity of the research (Miles et al., 2014, pp. 312-313). I strived to remain open to
contradictory perspectives, recognizing personal bias and preconceptions, and remaining
consistent in the gathering and analysis of the data.
This study focused on the perspectives of law enforcement officials from various
geographies and jurisdictions, in order to contribute to the advancement of empirical
knowledge in the field of radicalization. It was critical therefore, to establish its external
validity to determine if the findings were analytically generalizable to other situations and
not just this particular case (Yin, 2015, p. 40). One strategy for ensuring the external
validity of findings is by developing a thick description of the nature of the study’s
subject matter (Rudestam & Newton, 2015, p. 133). For this study, participant selection
and data collection approaches yielded an in-depth understanding of the radicalization
process of U.S. homegrown terrorists from the perspectives of law enforcement officers
at the local and state levels, as well as military antiterrorism officials, and security
personnel, thus satisfying the requirements for transferability or external validity.
Reliability relates to the consistency of data collection and analysis that
demonstrate quality processes and integrity of the researcher (Miles et al., 2014, p. 312).
In qualitative research, the lack of consistency in data collection and analysis could
discredit the study’s findings (O’Sullivan, Rassel, & Berner, 2008, p. 111). Researchers
should be mindful to use the same criteria for coding raw data throughout the research
(Rudestam & Newton, 2015, p. 132). It is reasonable to expect adjustments during and
after data collection, but in order to minimize threats to validity, researchers should
assess the consistency of their methods before data analysis (O’Sullivan et al., 2008, p.
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117). Testing for reliability is also an iterative process. For example, if the data shows
comparable findings across different sources, then the collection and analysis should be
reliable (Miles et al., 2014, p. 312). Other approaches also include the collection of
sufficient data to reach saturation and the development of a meticulous audit trail to
facilitate other researchers to retrace the investigation’s steps and potentially reach the
same findings (Rudestam & Newton, 2015, p. 133).
Qualitative researchers should strive to imbue their study with a high level of
confirmability, and minimize the influence that their personal views, prejudices, and bias
might have on the collection and analysis of data. This would allow others to replicate
their research and confirm their findings. They do so by providing an explicit description
of their methodology, a clear explanation of data collection and analysis, consideration of
discrepant cases or explanations, and by being transparent about how their views might
have influenced their findings (Miles et al., 2014, pp. 311-312). This study had the
required features to ensure confirmability. Chapter 4 (Findings) and Chapter 5
(Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations) established a link between the
interpretation of finding and conclusions, and relied heavily on the perspectives of the
participants, which is consistent with accepted confirmability strategies in qualitative
research (Cope, 2014, p. 89).
Ethical Procedures
Federal law requires institutions that receive federal grants for research involving
human subjects to minimize risks to human research participants, establishing a balance
between the benefit of the research versus the risk to the subject. Researchers must
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justify the essential need to use human participants; assure participants of their safety and
minimize risk; and conduct their study fairly and transparently. Participants must be
volunteers, must provide informed consent, and reserve the right to refuse to participate
in the study at any time. Finally, researchers must protect the confidentiality of the data,
as well as the anonymity of participants unless they provide their consent (Mandal &
Parija, 2011, p. 55). This study incorporated all those features.
Ethical standards require that researchers treat human subjects with respect by
obtaining informed consent and upholding the voluntary nature of their participation.
Researchers must also ensure that the benefits of their study outweigh the potential harm,
and should strive to minimize any harm to the participant (beneficence). Researchers
must assure the IRB that the research has a valid purpose (Rudestam & Newton, 2015,
pp. 313-314) as well as proving that participant selection supports the purpose of the
study, and that convenience or accessibility was the sole basis for their selection
(O’Sullivan et al., 2008, p. 252).
A significant concern involving qualitative research is ensuring the confidentiality
of data. Threats to confidentiality involve potential disclosure of sensitive information or
unauthorized access to the data through breaches of the database (Pope, 2015, p. 348). In
order to protect the data, the encrypted files were stored them in a separate external hard
drive. The identity of the participants was protected by only using initials and avoiding
specifying their specific work location.
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Summary
This qualitative case study aimed to derive empirical data that could shed a better
understanding of the process that leads to the radicalization of U.S. homegrown terrorists
based on current radicalization research, and interviews with local law enforcement
officials, state counterterrorism officers, military anti-terrorism officers, and security
personnel from locations in eastern North Carolina. Case study research was appropriate
because it helps develop an in-depth understanding of the radicalization of U.S.
homegrown terrorists from the perspectives of individuals who are familiar with the
concept. The study population for this study was a purposive sample of individuals
knowledgeable in the radicalization, counterterrorism, and antiterrorism fields from cities
from eastern North Carolina.
The study called for interviews with 26 participants. Interviews containing openended questions yielded valuable insights and fidelity. This qualitative case relied on In
Vivo coding for first cycle coding, which identifies key phrases, or words from the raw
data that helped identify themes and patterns (second cycle coding). Data analysis relied
on the use of computer assisted CAQDAS. This software assisted with data storage and
access, as well as tracking of completed and ongoing analysis. This study contained
credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability necessary to improve the
acceptance of its findings and contribute to the advancement of knowledge in the field of
radicalization. Finally, the study complied with established ethical standards and ensured
the anonymity and confidentiality of the participants. .
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Chapter 4: Results
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to derive empirical data to better
understand the process that leads to the radicalization of U.S. homegrown terrorists and
to apply the religious conversion theory as a model for understanding the radicalization
of U.S. homegrown terrorists. I incorporated data from current radicalization research
and interviews with law enforcement officials at the local and state levels with gang or
counterterrorism experience, as well as AT officers and security personnel from military
installations in Eastern North Carolina. I sought to identify the factors that contribute to
the radicalization of U.S. homegrown terrorists, potential intervention approaches from
the perspective of the participants, and how would a modification of the conversion
theory serve to explain the radicalization of U. S. homegrown terrorists. This chapter
includes the perspectives of the study participants on the factors that lead to the
radicalization of U.S. homegrown terrorists, based on their experience and training. It
has five sections: demographics and data collection, data analysis, evidence of
trustworthiness, results, and summary.
Demographics and Data Collection
Participants for this study included eight local police officers with experience in
gang investigations from four different local law enforcement agencies, two of which had
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) experience. Other participants included five AT
officers from two military installations, two with prior federal counterterrorism
experience with DHS and the United States Secret Service, and one with previous JTTF
experience. The next group included nine military installation security officers, five of
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them civilian and four uniformed. The last participant was a state-level counterterrorism
investigator. Data collection occurred over 9 weeks. Each interview lasted between 30
and 60 minutes and took place at the participants’ work place, after they read and signed
their informed consent form. There were no follow-up interviews. Each interview was
recorded using a digital voice recorder. To ensure participant confidentiality and
anonymity, their names appear only on the informed consent form and at the beginning of
the interview recording, but not on the transcript. Data were stored in an encrypted and
password-protected external hard drive.
The recruitment plan for this study included the number of participants each
organization, geography, and jurisdiction in order to meet the planned sample size of 26.
Partner organization leaders assisted in the identification of qualified study participants.
The plan included contingencies to recruit participants from other locations aside from
the initial potential sample pool. The goal was to include at least two law enforcement
officers with counterterrorism and AT experience from police departments in the cities of
Goldsboro, Fayetteville, and Jacksonville. I also included two AT officers from Seymour
Johnson Air Force Base, Camp Lejeune, and Fort Bragg; three federal officers; and five
state officers.
After engaging with the various organizations to solicit participation in the study,
it became evident that it was not feasible to recruit participants from the FBI or Camp
Lejeune. It was likewise impractical to interview local police officers currently
collaborating with the JTTF. Overall, the participant pool consisted of 23 participants.
At the local level, the emphasis shifted to law enforcement officials with gang experience
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because gang members usually undergo a similar radicalization process, and an
understanding of gangs can provide insights into radicalization and extremism (Decker &
Pyrooz, 2015). Members of the Cumberland County Sherriff’s Office, as well as civilian
police, and military security forces from military installations were also included. Seven
participants had experience with federal counterterrorism agencies, such as the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the FBI, United States Secret Service, or
JTTF; one of the participants worked at the state level. The interviews were a
straightforward affair; there were no unusual circumstances during the interactions.
Some of the local police officers expressed concerns that they would not be able to
contribute to the research because of their lack of involvement in counterterrorism
investigations, but felt more confident after explaining the similarities between the
radicalization dynamics of gang members and individuals who embrace extremism.
Data Analysis
In this qualitative case study, I sought to derive empirical data that could shed a
better understanding of the process that leads to the radicalization of U.S. homegrown
terrorists and to apply the religious conversion theory as a model for understanding
radicalization. I also incorporated data from current radicalization research.
The coding process included content-directed coding using the broad categories of
the conversion theory to develop initial code categories. This led to first cycle coding,
using in Vivo coding, in which codes, key phrases, or words from the raw data helped
visualize the emergence of themes and patterns. The next step was second cycle coding
to identify emerging patterns and themes (Miles et al., 2014). Second cycle coding
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involves reassembling the codes or labels into clusters or themes, followed by the
interpretation and drawing conclusions (Yin, 2011, p. 176).
The analysis process began with the transcription of the interviews, using Atlas TI
to highlight key statements and words the participants shared and placing them into
categories. The initial codes for the study were counterterrorism experience and training,
definition of homegrown terrorism, the group that represented the greatest threat,
individual factors, environmental factors, crisis, access to extremist propaganda,
countering extremist propaganda, and point of no return. During the initial coding and
analysis, it became apparent that the initial sets of codes were insufficient to capture the
perspectives of the participants, leading to the addition of motivation.
Counterterrorism Experience and Training
Mastors and Siers (2014) identified the lack of a robust body of empirical
research on the radicalization process as a contributing factor in the understanding this
phenomenon. In order to overcome this shortfall, the participants in this study included
law enforcement officials at the local and state levels with counterterrorism or gang
experience and AT officers and security personnel from military installations. It was
important to ascertain the participants’ training and experience to establish their
qualifications for participation in the case study. Although there are differences between
counterterrorism and AT operations, involvement in both require collaboration with
organizations dedicated to protect life and property against acts of terror and imbue the
individual with knowledge of terrorist operations and threats.
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Definition of Homegrown Terrorism
The first step in solving a problem is defining it. One of the challenges associated
with addressing the threat of homegrown terrorism is finding a comprehensive definition
that incorporates its varied dynamics. Such a definition would allow counterterrorism
and AT stakeholders to develop and implement effective initiatives to attack the source of
extremist socialization. It could also help develop strategies to inoculate the population,
especially those who are more susceptible to such propaganda, from internalizing these
messages and going down the path of radicalization.
Group That Represented the Greatest Threat
This code incorporated participant perspectives of the greatest homegrown
terrorist or extremist threat. Their experience and training provides a lens through which
they assess the threat. This perspective is important because it relates to individual
factors, environmental factors, the manner in which they access extremist propaganda,
and the development of effective counter propaganda efforts. Extremist and terrorist
groups have different objectives and modes of operation.
Individual Factors
This code relates to the context stage of the conversion model and the first
research question (What individual and environmental factors contribute to the
radicalization of U. S. homegrown terrorists?). It includes beliefs, motivations,
aspirations, experiences, and perspectives that could make an individual susceptible to
radicalization. Extremists exploit these factors to recruit and indoctrinate supporters.
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Environmental Factors
This code also relates to the context stage of the conversion model, and the first
research question (what individual and environmental factors contribute to the
radicalization of U. S. homegrown terrorists?). It includes associations, relationships, or
networks that could make the individual susceptible to radicalization. When coupled
with individual factors, environmental factors influence the way individuals approach
crisis.
Crisis
This code relates to the crisis stage of the conversion model and the first research
question (What individual and environmental factors contribute to the radicalization of
U.S. homegrown terrorists?). Crisis could result from a traumatic episode or from a
series of setbacks. Regardless of its source, it could precipitate an individual’s loss of
emotional or moral balance, sense of purpose, or self-worth, leading him or her to seek an
ideology or outlook in an effort to regain what was lost.
Access to Extremist Propaganda
This code relates to the quest, encounter, and interaction stages of the conversion
model, and the second research question (What form of intervention would be effective to
curtail radicalization?). It refers to the source from which individuals might access
extremist rhetoric, ideology, and messages that could lead them along the radicalization
path. An understanding of this function could inform counter propaganda efforts.
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Countering Extremist Propaganda
This code relates to the second research question (what form of intervention
would be effective to curtail radicalization?). Participants shared recommendations on
approaches that could prove effective in countering the effects of extremist messaging or
propaganda. It could include individuals or entities that could influence an individual
progressing along the radicalization continuum.
Motivation
This code includes participant perspectives on conditions that might prompt
individuals to become radicalized or join an extremist organization. The insights related
to this code are significant for addressing these issues in comprehensive counter
propaganda initiatives. It relates to the context and crisis stages of the conversion theory
and informs the second research question (what form of intervention would be effective
to curtail radicalization?).
Point of no Return
This code relates to the commitment and consequences stages of the conversion
model, as well as the third research question (how would a modification of the
conversion theory serve to explain the radicalization of U.S. homegrown terrorists?). The
point of no return is the point in which efforts to stem the advance of an individual along
the radicalization continuum become ineffective.
Results
The radicalization of U.S. homegrown terrorists is a complex phenomenon with
significant public policy and social implications. In this study, I sought to address several
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gaps in the understanding of radicalization. The first gap was an insufficient
understanding of how individual and social factors influence radicalization (Kleinmann,
2012). The second gap was the lack of a comprehensive model for analyzing
radicalization (Ferguson & Binks, 2015, p. 21). These shortfalls in knowledge have
significant implications in terms of developing effective approaches to curtail
radicalization and stem the growth of homegrown terrorism.
In following section, I will discuss participant qualifications for involvement in
the study, their definitions of homegrown terrorism, and their perspectives on the greatest
threat to national security. I will then address each of this study’s research questions.
Each research question section incorporated the responses to each relevant code.
Experience and Training
Of the 23 participants, 15 had military experience. All participants working on
military installations had AT training, a yearly requirement for Department of Defense
employees. All five participants serving as installation AT officers had military
experience with deployments in support of combat operations. Although I was unable to
interview anyone who currently worked with the FBI JTTF, at least three local law
enforcement participants had prior experience working with the JTTF. The other local
police officers were working with, or had experience, with the gang investigative unit. A
review of the background of the participants validated that they had the experience and
training to have informed perspectives on extremist organizations, the main source of
homegrown violent extremists or terrorists. Their current or past duties exposed them to
information on extremists’ goals, recruiting efforts, and indoctrination. Overall, the
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collective experience of these participants allowed them to provide rich data to inform
radicalization.
Defining Homegrown Terrorism
Participants shared their personal definitions of homegrown terrorism to establish
context to their perspectives. They also provided views on the groups that represented
the greatest threat. Participants provided a wealth of views to this question. Several
military installation AT officers alluded to the difficulties in defining this phenomenon.
DM stated, “it’s hard to define,” while BB argued that “it gets convoluted depending on
who you talk to.” CF added, “it’s something you can't predict, it's not traceable, there's
no threat stream.”
Other definitions were more comprehensive, such as AA’s, whose response was
“a United States citizen radicalized in the prison system, returning to the street, and
looking for their self or purpose.” PL referred to “anyone from within the country who
changed their philosophy from being pro-America to being anti-American in some form
or another.” SN added, “someone who has been radicalized that goes against what we
perceive as the norms of American society.” NK provided a more nuanced definition. In
his view “a homegrown violent extremist deals with a radical ideology that has roots with
a foreign terrorist organization, but they're not a card-carrying member, nor do they take
tactical direction [from that organization].” AM indicated, “I think of a lone wolf; an
individual, probably not even born and raised in the United States, and brought up in the
formative years.” DK suggested,
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Someone who lives in America, may be a naturalized citizen, someone who calls
America home for a period of time, but doesn't agree with American policy,
turned their back on western civilization and start to believe in extremist efforts to
overthrow that policy.
RR referred to “a U.S. based person; might be a citizen, might not be a citizen, they
commit a criminal act to further their agenda, be that political or religious.” BB
contributed that “most of them don’t have a connection with an external source.” These
definitions are consistent with Bjelopera’ s definition.
Some participants clarified the ideological differences among homegrown
terrorists. SS stated, “it’s not just Islamic terrorism, it can be secular, or Christian,” while
DK added that “there's extremism in just about every religion; Christians fire-bomb
abortion clinics, anarchists who don't believe in standing government attack federal
buildings.” JS contributed that a homegrown terrorist “believes that the government is
out of control, it has too much control, too much power, they are money hungry and don’t
care about the citizens.” CW stated, “homegrown terrorism comes from a person's
personal choice to accept an ideology that matches their views.”
Greatest Threat
Regarding the group that represents the greatest threat to security in the United
States, 12 respondents placed Islamic-motivated individuals on top of the list. Sovereign
citizen and criminal gangs were the second most assessed greatest threat. Insider threats
and religion-motivated individuals (regardless of faith) were at the bottom of the list. It
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was evident that the participants’ background influenced their definition of homegrown
terrorists and threat assessments.
Research Question 1
This section includes relevant codes that help address the dynamics that could
lead individuals to become radicalized. They are individual factors, environmental
factors, crisis, motivations, and access to extremist propaganda. Their placement follows
the order of the radicalization stages according to the conversion theory. The combined
effects of individual and environmental factors generate a crisis and motivate them to
embrace extremism. Participant perspectives were generally consistent with the findings
in the literature.
Individual Factors
Participants identified 58 individual factors they considered made individuals
susceptible to radicalization. An analysis of the cited factors generated three narrower
categories: self-worth, maturity, and cognitive development. This is consistent with
second cycle coding (Yin, 2011, p. 176).
Self-worth. The self-worth category included themes such as hopelessness, lack
of self-worth, low self-esteem, and lack of purpose or belonging. As BB stated, “People
that don’t see that my life means anything” and “I think its self-worth starts and
isolationism compounds it.” PL added, “they no longer value themselves individually.”
SN contributed, “lack of self-worth, purpose, belonging.” EH considered that individuals
who embrace radicalization lost hope.
Maturity. Specific factors related to maturity included mental capacity,
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misguided, ease of persuasion, weak-mindedness, malleability, and ease of influence. BB
noted,
We have kids that get on computers continually. It has also degraded our
maturity levels. That’s why you see people in the age groups of 20s to 30s
susceptible to influences outside of the main church, state, family; because they
are not at the maturity level you would expect a 25-year-old to be at.
JS commented, “they have no impulse control, no concept of the consequences for
their actions.”
Cognitive development. Closely related to maturity, cognitive development
might also influence the adoption of radical ideologies. Participant responses included
lack of education and psychological events that alter thought processes. From DM’s
perspective, “some people do not have the mental intestinal fortitude to stand up for a
strong belief system and are easily swayed.” BG suggested of individuals who embrace
extremism, “most of them are not fully educated,” indicating a poor of understanding of
what they are doing. SN considered, “an individual with lower education and working a
minimum wage job as being more susceptible to being radicalized.”
Environmental factors
Another condition that might influence radicalization is the environment that
surrounds the individual. While individual factors relate to the individual’s personal
background, environmental factors have to do with their upbringing, their associations,
and their support network. Participants identified 76 environmental factors they
estimated influenced radicalization, organized under categories such as positive
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reinforcement, reactions, family life, and community support. Several participants
clarified that while certain environmental factors might make individuals susceptible to
radicalization, there are no “cookie cutter” answers regarding environmental factors;
people react differently to similar situations. Their perspectives were generally consistent
with the findings in the literature.
Positive reinforcement. Participants observed that individuals without positive
support groups and reinforcement, who lacked structure, and felt the need for affiliating
with individuals with similar views, seem more apt to embrace radicalism. BB stated,
“we want to talk to people, we want people to be like us, we want to have friends,” which
coincides with CC’s view that “we tend to cling to people that we have stuff in common.”
This need for support allows extremists to recruit and indoctrinate followers. DD
explained that extremists bring newcomers into their fold, show them that they are part of
the family, “and once they're in that comfort zone, they feel like family, you can start
training them to the way you want them to be.” DD added that the inclusion of religious
undertones and justification of actions in support of God provide a significant level of
support. PS considered that the new associations provide individuals with “a brotherhood
and somebody cares.”
Reactions. In some instances, individuals could embrace radical views as a
reaction to environmental threats, real or perceived. NK asserted that individuals
embrace extremism as a form of opposition to threats by stating, “it all comes down to us
versus them” and “its going to be you and your buddies.” Other responses highlighted
reactions to individual’s inability to meet their objectives such as “everything he tried, he
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failed at”, “he got knocked down”, or “the other person is a problem or the reason for
their problems.” Other reasons that study participants discussed involved unfavorable
experiences with other environmental elements such as bullying, teasing, negative
interactions with law enforcement, or the perception that society pushed them away.
These events and experiences lead to a condition that RR explained, “the feeling of low
self value and worth that is being manipulated when they're down.”
Family life. Study participants identified factors related to the deterioration of
family life as significant contributors to radicalization. They identified the disintegration
of the family, not having a strong family, the lack of a family structure, individuals
detached from their normal family, poor parental involvement with youth, and
individuals looking for the support they do not get at home as salient environmental
concerns. In general, the lack of strong family bonds might lead individuals to embrace
associations to fill that void, a situation that could favor the introduction of external
influences. For example, BB stated,
When we grew up, the family was important; you dealt with family on a daily
basis; you ate your meals; you did things together. School added to that; it was a
partnership. Church also, everyone knew everybody. It’s not that way anymore.
SN commented, “if you don’t have the structure or support network, you are on
your own. It’s one of the factors that make inner city youth susceptible to join gangs.”
From the opposite perspective, family dynamics can serve as a catalyst for the adoption
of extremist views. From AM’s perspective, “certain ideas could be imprinted, talking
around the dinner table, with parents who have an ideology or worldview about certain
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cultures of groups of people,” so this could lead to an environment in which extremist
views pass from one generation to the next. On this topic, CW added, “White
supremacists are indoctrinated at an early age; it’s a family social group.”
Community support. Participants identified factors related to community
support during their interviews. Most of them related perspectives of community
disengagement. AA talked about individuals who lived outside of the community fold
when stating, “but for whatever reason wasn’t accepted, didn’t feel a sense of
community,” and that extremists want to “cut off their relationship with their family and
community.” NK asserted that the risk of radicalization increased “if you're not
connected to your community.” Family, associations, support networks, and the
community all play a role in the socialization of the individual. BB commented, “the
actual physical socialization process has been blown completely apart.” This could then
provide opportunities for other influences, which could lead individuals to embrace
extremism, as WH stated, “you are dealing with somebody who don’t have someone to
sit with them, the influence in their lives, to mentor them.”
Additional themes. Other themes that participants suggested included meeting
perceived needs and identity, the gang as family, the development of group mentality,
and brainwashing. In some instances, as WH stated, “they grow up knowing [or
thinking] that theirs is the right way of doing things,” not being able to differentiate
between right and wrong. These perspectives illustrate the importance that positive
support has on the development of an individual’s moral code.
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Crisis
The combination of individual and environmental factors set the conditions for
individuals to undergo a crisis that could potentially lead them to radicalization. Study
participants identified 25 events that could potentially lead individuals to a crisis state.
Subsets of this code include losses, perceptions, and external triggers. Five participants
would not commit to any specific event that could precipitate a crisis because it varies
from person to person. DM also alluded to the complex nature of crisis and provided a
comprehensive definition:
It could be a multitude of things; it could be death in the family, it could be abuse,
drugs, like I said, in some cases it could be financial factors, or it could be that
person who feels like they’re lost out there and they are open to any new idea.
SS noted that it could be a series of events or setbacks, not just one event, that
could precipitate a crisis.
Losses. Three participants considered financial losses significant enough to
contribute to a loss of purpose or significance. Three others cited personal losses or death
of a family member as a crisis-precipitating event. Two other participants indicated that
challenges to faith or religious foundation could also contribute to individuals losing their
sense of stability and develop a crisis.
Perceptions. There are instances when crisis-generating events result from
perceptions. For example, BB asserted that it could relate to the manner in which
individuals “interpret and misrepresent information,” resulting in a skewed view of the
situation. JS’s perspective supports this assertion. In his view, individuals might
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“believe either the government was doing too much, acting beyond their scope of
responsibility and priorities, or were not doing enough.” He also felt that individuals
“believe they are being held back, being oppressed, and not afforded the same
opportunities.” JP added that individuals sometimes develop a perception that “[they are]
continually getting beat down, not physically, but through society, not getting the job that
they want, not getting into the college they want, not being able to make the money they
want.” These perceptions might lead to a feeling of disenfranchisement, which AA
argued, “makes a population that is ripe for recruitment.”
External triggers. Another perspective regarding crisis-generating events
concerns external triggers, or actions from external entities. According to AM, such an
event could be one that “touches me or something to do with me, my family, or my
belief, or my religion.” Other potential external triggers include discrimination, bullying,
or peer pressure. JS also noted how the influence of the environment, by observing that
individuals experiencing crisis “grew up in this life.” WH proposed that a lack of
parental guidance could also precipitate a crisis.
Motivations
Study participants provided insightful perspectives on what motivates individuals
to embrace beliefs associated with extremist organizations. This was not a specific
question from the data collection protocol, but their responses justified adding this
particular theme. The participants identified 63 motivations for joining extremist
organizations. They are grouped under the following categories: the need to belong,
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grievances, dissatisfaction with status quo, protection or survival, religious zeal, seeking
a sense of purpose, thrill seeking, or financial profit.
Need to belong. Study participants identified 13 motivations associated with the
need to belong and for acceptance. Among these, the most common motivation is the
need to fit in. From DD’s view, “they are looking for something or somebody to
understand them, nurture them.” BB discussed, “Like most gangs, if I get accepted I
walk around bolder, and chest popped up a little bit. If I don’t get accepted I need to find
someone that will accept me.” According to JW, “they're looking for something…fit into
a society or group, they come to believe that they fit in and started to believe what other
person is selling.” This perspective suggests that a person can join a group without
accepting their beliefs and can embrace them afterwards. The need to fill a void in their
lives was the second most identified reason. These answers suggest that individuals find
themselves not fitting into their environment and seek ways to fill emotional voids or find
acceptance they otherwise do not have, either because they do not have a strong support
network at home or because their views are not consistent with the majority. RR alluded
to this situation when discussing online forums and discussion groups: “There's an
instantaneous gang without even having to be jumped in now.” These conditions make
individuals who do not have strong support networks susceptible to radicalization.
Grievances. Participants identified 13 grievances that could serve as a
motivation for individuals to embrace an extremist ideology or join an extremist group.
The most common grievance has to do with revenge or retaliation for actual or perceived
wrongs or affronts against a person’s culture, ethnicity, or beliefs. Some of these
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grievances relate to feelings of distrust against the government. Individuals could be
upset with the police, or perceive a lack of trust in the government and its leaders. For
example, BG stated, “they thought the government was screwing them,” while CC
suggested some people develop “resentment against our policies.” According to JS,
Sovereign Citizens, “do not trust the government or any symbol of authority.” In the case
of white supremacists, they might distrust other ethnicities or races. The last grievance
has to do with feelings of despair. As PS stated, “Somehow they're upset with something
like that and [it] has to be changed; they're trying to show their purpose, you're not
listening to my story my idea. What I want doesn’t matter .” At some point, these
grievances become so overwhelming that they could lead individuals to embrace
alternative views that challenge what they view as oppression or injustice. Under the
right conditions, and with the support of others who share similar perspectives, these
feelings could evolve to the need to take action, and in some cases, that action could be
violence.
Dissatisfaction with status quo. Another motivation for embracing opposing,
and oftentimes extremist views, is a deep-rooted dissatisfaction with the current state of
affairs or status quo. Participants identified 12 examples of this motivation, which was
evenly split between anti government views and desires for a better outlook in life. BB
considered how people might feel about the current political situation; “people get
outraged, that’s not what I’m about, I don’t want to be associated with anybody that is
about that. So how do I disassociate with something?. I move as far away from it as I
can.” According to JS, Sovereign Citizens, “they become a sovereign citizen or extremist
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as much as they believe they’re going to create their own country within the United
States, they don’t have to follow the constitution, state laws, federal laws.” DM pointed
to the internal conflicts that some individuals might experience and offered,
A segment of the population is pushing this narrative that America is a bad
country; look what we did to the Indians [Native Americans], we had slavery, we
interned the Japanese during WWII. I love America because it has all these
freedoms, but I hate it because it’s tainted. Others might fall victim to extremist
propaganda.
Based on his experience, BB related the themes the message contains
You are hating life right now, your parents suck, they are making you do things
you don’t want to do, the world is treating you like crap, you don’t have a job, but
here is something that will help you.
CC added, “I belong to something, it might not be perfect but it's far better where
I came from.”
Protection or survival. One of the many motivations for individuals to join
extremist groups or gangs is for protection or survival against real or perceived threats.
Study participants identified nine such factors, with all of them pointing to a variety of
threats. BB asserted that “as with gangs, people join them [extremist groups] for
protection in jail. Non radicals might join radicals for the same reason.” WH pointed out
that “they don’t feel they are being protected, they don’t have an identity, somebody is
against them.” Individuals victimized by bullies might also turn to gangs for protection,
as WH posited, “you have younger kids, who might be smaller or weaker, and they are

98
constantly being bullied at school so they look at a protector so to speak, it might be a
gang member.”
Religious zeal. Religion could influence individuals to embrace extremism.
Study participants referred to religion as a mediating factor that could lead individuals to
radicalization. MB commented, “a person who is lost and find religion appealing and
they could help radicalize them.” SN discussed how Major Nidal Hassan, who killed 13
people in Texas in 2007, “was doing it for religious [reasons], maybe not political.”
From BB’s perspective
Almost all the wars in history have been fought because we had some religious
[reason] thrown in and that’s what increases the intensity. It’s the step that gets
them beyond fighting and committing suicide to further their element. Religion is
very strong to most people, it’s what they hold and latch on to.
MB provided a keen observation, “a person who is lost and finds religion
appealing and they [extremists] could help radicalize them.”
Seeking a sense of purpose. A lack of purpose in life was a significant
individual factor that made individuals susceptible to radicalization. Participants
identified six motivations related to seeking a sense of purpose that drove individuals to
embrace extremism. The loss of purpose or significance is also an outcome resulting
from a crisis, a major stage within the radicalization process. According to the
participants, individuals join extremist groups to find a reason for being, to be
remembered, or to contribute to a cause. AM postulated, “they believe what they doing
supports a cause…they believe that they are right.”
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Accessing extremist propaganda
As stated previously, individuals who have the right combination of individual
and environmental factors are susceptible to the influence of extremist propaganda. They
might encounter it before or after a crisis, but in any case, accessing this material, under
the right conditions, can lead individuals to become radicalized. Interviewees shared
their views on the means by which individuals access extremist materials. While they
identified the Internet and news media as the most prevalent means, they also discussed
other alternative means. Their perspectives were generally consistent with the literature,
but some participants shared views that the literature did not address.
Internet and social media. The majority of participants pointed to the Internet
and social media as the main source for individuals to access extremist propaganda.
According to SS,
Those individuals, you can monitor whatever you want to monitor, but frankly if
they are holed up in their room with their computer, accessing this stuff,
radicalizing themselves, looking for things using search engines, and you know
how search engines work, you already accessed a few sites, they’ll steer them to
other sites.
Extremist organizations have become quite adept at leveraging the power of the
Internet and social media to share their messages. NK commented, “[extremist group]
spokespeople are very charismatic and speak the language; they're hitting up any
platform you could think of.” RR expanded on this perspective,
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I can sit in my room and be online with like-minded people that are in the same
negative world,” while also acknowledging that extremists do not rely solely on
the Internet and social media to spread their message by pointing to “the media
outlets, TV, video games.
According to JS, extremists are developing ways to protect their messages “ [they
use] twitter and there is something that they were posting within the message that let you
know that it was a trusted source and you could go to a different page or link on the
Internet to find what message they were trying to put out.”
News media. The media, such as news and other commercial broadcasting
methods contribute to the dissemination of messages that generate or exacerbate the crisis
state and influence the path to radicalization. These messages have a socializing effect
on the individual. DM provided an interesting perspective by stating, “news
organizations that are sending out conflicting images and information so people don’t
know who to trust” and expanding further by postulating that the media has propagated a
“narrative that America is a bad country.” BB also asserted the influence of media, “the
biggest influence individuals have in their daily lives is the TV and Internet.” Other
means according to BG include “charismatic speakers…you hear the right thing and
eventually you're going to drift away nobody's going to pull you back.” SN added, “there
has to be a network somewhere be it someone providing them with information to turn
them, someone who is providing material resources, or training.” EH alluded to the fact
that the messages are “being reinforced continuously.”
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Other means. The Internet and the news media are not the only ways that
individuals use to access extremist propaganda. Participants suggested that personal
contact and “word of mouth” have in radicalization. This is especially important when
considering captive populations such as individuals in prison, those who live in ganginfested communities, or those who grow up in families where they receive constant
extremist indoctrination. Other forms of media, like music and music videos serve as
socializing vehicle, especially among gang members and white supremacists.
These statements illustrate the importance of the Internet and social media as a
preferred means to propagate extremist messages, but also point to other means of
disseminating extremist propaganda. From BB’s perspective, “individual contact I think
is the biggest one, and then it gets followed on with Internet and media anywhere in the
world where you can find the information you seek.” AM argued that the media plays an
important role in spreading extremist propaganda by stating, “the media is that gateway;
it drives me to the underground Internet to find those blogs, those websites to seek out
information.” At least eight participants expressed that the media, whether in television
or print, played a significant role in the dissemination of extremist messages. One
participant stated that the 24-hour news cycle and the constant exposure to terrorist
attacks made it so that “they don’t have to search; it’s all over the news.” Another
participant indicated that the news media “repackaged the [terrorists’] message.” Five
participants opined that personal contact was also an effective means to access
propaganda. Three mentioned radicalization in prison as the initial access point for
radicalization, while one referred to music and concerts for spreading extremism.
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Research Question 2
This section includes participants’ proposals regarding intervention strategies to
prevent individuals from advancing along the radicalization process. In response to this
question, participants identified 41 efforts. The most commonly suggested approaches
were the creation of doubt among at-risk individuals regarding the validity of their
extremist ideology, leveraging former extremists, and greater community involvement.
Their perspectives were generally consistent with the findings in the literature.
Creating doubt
Participants suggested the implementation of strategies that create doubt in the
mind of individuals who might be at risk for radicalization, or who are already advancing
on this path, by exposing them to the unvarnished reality of the path they considered
embarking upon. DM argued, “Something has to happen that makes them question their
new ideology.” In this regard, DK proposed, “It's almost like that scared straight kind of
thing and putting into them to fear what they can become what can happen to them if they
could do a down that path.” CF recommended showing them “showing what the groundlevel guys are dealing with,” which could create, according to SS, “doubts about what he
was doing.” With a more radical approach, BB argued for, “showing when we get their
videos of chopping off heads and burning them in cages, and we broadcast that, tell me
how this is a civilized and peaceful religion?”
Leveraging former extremists
Closely related to this strategy, was the collaboration with former extremists or
gang members to engage individuals and share their experiences in an effort to dissuade
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them from following in their footsteps. DM suggested, “someone who might have been
going down the radicalization process, get that counter message, causes them to question
that direction they’re going, you can turn them around.” BB considered, “get some of
these people who were on this path, that did break that cycle and get the word out there.”
SS suggested leveraging “a former gang member who knows their language and
understands exactly what they are going through.”
Greater community involvement
Participants suggested that greater community involvement was critical to the
implementation of effective intervention approaches. This includes the creation of
positive interactions with various community stakeholders, such as youth or community
programs, law enforcement, and religious entities, which could provide an alternative
view to that of extremists. DK suggested, “reintroduce them into the community and
show them that what you're preaching and reading and believing…they're pulling the
wool over their eyes that's not what America is about.” One specific program in this
category originated with a local police department, which staged interventions for
convicted felons when they started to stray away back to their former ways. JP described
the program:
We give them job opportunities, places that accept convicted felons to work there,
we have a priest or pastor come in so they have someone to speak to, will have
their family members there to show them how it's impacting their life, it's hurting
you, and their kids.
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The police department had conducted only one such intervention so there was no
feedback available, but it illustrates how stakeholders are leveraging all the local
resources at their disposal to reintegrate individuals into the community and give them a
sense of value and purpose.
Participants also proposed the introduction of mentorship programs to provide
individuals with productive guidance to help them address their daily challenges. BB
recommended,
You have to get somebody who they will listen to and respect to tell them that is
not the life. The moderate Muslims of America need to come to the aid of
troubled youth on the path of self-destruction. If it’s somebody that can talk or at
least reach out to somebody logically then they have a chance of not going down
that road.
JS argued that it does not need to be elaborate: “it might be time, to sit down and
talk to them, and listen to them, and tell them that things aren’t as bad as they think,”
while PS argued that it might just entail “having somebody to talk to. Is understanding
the reasons why this person's going down that path what makes them do that.” Greater
community involvement rests on the collaboration of a variety of community
stakeholders. The most referenced stakeholder, from interviewees’ perspective, is the
family. They advocated for greater parental engagement as well as collaboration with
other stakeholders. From RR’s vantage point, “the first place to start is within the home.”
Other stakeholders include religious leaders, mentors, or anyone who can influence
individuals and provide a different perspective, an alternative to extremism.
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Participants also advocated for greater involvement from local government
officials and agencies. NK proposed,
In the UK they tried to integrate social services, medical services; the softer stuff
that's not a sexy. I believe that there are some softer entities and approaches in
addition to law enforcement efforts. There are some economic factors that cause
people to become isolated. The softer items are shown to be contributing factors
that lead to radicalization. The holistic approach it's a must.
These perspectives underscore the importance of involving as many community
stakeholders in countering extremism.
Challenges
In spite of the best intentions and efforts of law enforcement and community
stakeholders, the implementation of programs aimed at countering extremist propaganda
and ideologies faces tangible challenges. Participants identified challenges in the
implementation of counter extremist efforts. The most commonly discussed challenges
were ineffective government responses and difficulty in recognizing indicators.
Ineffective government responses. The most commonly cited challenge was
ineffective government responses to extremist propaganda. An important feature of any
information-based effort is the delivery of the message to the target audience in a manner
that influences their behavior. These programs must consider local dynamics. Cities in
the west coast will generally present different demographics and even climate than cities
in the Midwest or Southeast part of the United States. Likewise, small towns are quite
different from big cities. According to the participants, existing counter propaganda
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efforts are not reaching the individuals at the local level. As NK noted, “messages don’t
resonate with those at the community level, they are not engaging at the hometown level”
and DM also stated, “[the message} is not reaching to the bottom where it needs to be.”
The communicator also influences the effectiveness of the message. From BG’s
perspective, “if it isn't someone close to you, you're not going to listen.” EH added,
“what I say might resonate with a very small segment; there are target audiences that will
not hear me. One I am a law enforcement officer, two, I am a middle-aged white guy.”
Difficulty in recognizing indicators. It is difficult to intervene without the
recognition of indicators. Some people might see some signs, but fail to put them in
context. SN suggested, “people around them, family members, don’t see it, well they did
see, but they didn’t realize they did until afterwards.” These conditions highlight the
complexity of the problem. In addition, because they usually operate in small numbers
and do not coordinate directly with terrorist organizations, radicalized individuals or
homegrown terrorists present a small signature that could give away to their intentions.
BG suggested, “they're going to choose to stay off the radar,” while SS cautioned, “the
biggest challenge is probably going to be these individuals who show no patterns. There
are some individual factors here that aren’t going to fit that model and those are the
individuals who are going to slip through the cracks.” MB argued, “unless they're trying
to lead or are outspoken, homegrown violent extremists are hard to find.” It is important
then, for family members, friends, and the community to engage with at-risk individuals
to be able to identify changes in behavior that could signal their conversion to extremism.
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Research Question 3
While participants’ experience and training allowed them to provide a wealth of
perspectives regarding factors that could influence radicalization and possible
intervention approaches, they were not familiar with the conversion theory and the
radicalization model. It would not have been appropriate to elicit their recommendations
on how to modify it, since they would not have been able to provide informed
perspectives.
Feedback on conversion model
Several participants however, provided unsolicited assessments of how the model
depicted the progression along the radicalization continuum. CC and SS indicated that
they liked how the model captured the radicalization process. DD added, “This is a good
model, I haven't seen it laid out like this but I do like this.” CF stated, “I think your
model is fantastic,” while JP expressed, “I think the model does a really good job.”
Point of no return
Although they had limited exposure to the radicalization model, participants
provided their perspectives regarding the point of no return in terms of radicalization,
which is an implied point within the radicalization continuum. Eight participants argued
that the point of no return is near the commitment stage of the conversion model. Based
on this perspective, once individuals reach this level, rehabilitation will be difficult. AA
argued, “I like looking at breaking the cycle, but first if you don’t recognize it, you go
past the point of no return and we have a real problem.” BB offered,
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I think you have to get to them before they decide on taking action, but it is
extremely hard to tell when they get to that point. We have to break the pattern,
but once the individual determines or reaches the final point, you aren’t stopping
it. We have to determine what the individual is thinking.
Juxtaposing this perspective, eight other participants stated that there is not a
point of no return; radicalized individuals can come back from the brink of radicalization
at any stage. For example, JP stated, “ there really isn't a point of no return unless they
kill themselves,” while JS asserted, “for gangs, at any given point in their lives, there’s
got to be that break, [a] catalyst, [a] reason they want to get out.” On this topic, AA
stated, “you can get someone to the boiling point, but cannot stay there forever.” This
might suggest that there are no hard answers to this question, and that it varies according
to the individual. Finally, seven participants considered that reaching the point of no
return depends on certain conditions. DE and DK thought that varied among individuals.
Three other participants considered that individuals reach the point of no return if they
decide to take action, justify their use of violence, or had already engaged in violent
behavior. The remaining two participants argued that it is possible to bring back
individuals from the point of no return only if the incentives override their commitment.
EH proposed, “without a defining moment forcing that person to see they've gotten to the
lowest point but they could go, they don't self-actualize and realize I'm not going to have
a long life with this.” The factors that make extrication from the radicalization process
difficult, and could ultimately lead to violence, are worthy of analysis because they could
inform deradicalization efforts.
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Evidence of Trustworthiness
Qualitative research seeks to develop an understanding of complex events or
phenomena eliciting the perspectives of participants with robust knowledge of the subject
matter. While this methodology does not feature controls imbedded in quantitative
inquiry, qualitative researchers should establish high levels of validity and reliability that
clearly demonstrates the value of their empirical findings in order to add to the existing
body of knowledge in the given discipline, and more importantly, contribute to the
solution of pressing social problems. Maxwell (2013) postulated that the introduction of
researcher bias into the data collection and analysis threatens the validity of the study’s
findings (p. 124). Qualitative researchers can imbue their studies with procedures to
ensure the validity and transferability of their findings to other contexts and that given a
similar population other researchers can reach similar results. These procedures include a
detailed description of sample population, study settings, and methodology; the inclusion
of robust description of the findings; and conclusions are consistent with other sources
(triangulation) (Miles et al. 2014, pp. 312-314).
In order to achieve a high level of validity, each participant was assessed in order
to determine that they possessed the requisite knowledge and experience to provide
informed perspectives on radicalization. The planned sample population included local
law enforcement with experience with counterterrorism operations, acquired through
collaboration with the FBI’s JTTF. This proved to be unfeasible since the FBI limits
their agents and other collaborating law enforcement officials’ participation in research
given the sensitivity of their investigations. This resulted in an adjustment in the sample
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population to include local law enforcement officers with experience with gang
investigation units, because gang members usually undergo a similar radicalization
process as terrorists, and understanding gang dynamics offer a different perspective that
could shed valuable insights into radicalization and extremism (Decker & Pyrooz, 2015,
p. 109).
The participant pool also included military anti terrorism and law enforcement
officials, who protect military installations daily against all sorts of threats, to include
terrorism. The inclusion of 23 participants from a wide range of jurisdictions with
different levels of training and relevant experience provided a significant degree of
source triangulation. Finally, the analysis of the data included a rich description of
participant perspectives. Their views were captured using In Vivo coding, which helped
develop themes and patterns, followed by the reassembling them into clusters or themes,
consistent case study protocols (Yin, 2011, p. 176). Finally, throughout the analysis,
participant responses were checked against the findings from relevant scholarly research,
assessing a high degree of consistency between them.
Summary
This qualitative case study aimed to derive empirical data that can shed a better
understanding of the process that leads to the radicalization of U.S. homegrown terrorists
based on interviews with local law enforcement officials, state counterterrorism officers,
and military anti-terrorism officers from locations in eastern North Carolina. The
analysis of the data suggested that the participants had the requisite experience and
training to provide informed perspectives on the matter of the study. They were able to
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provide keen insights into the individual and environmental factors that could predispose
individuals to embrace extremist values and beliefs. They were likewise able to offer
thoughtful perspectives on events that could lead individuals to a crisis state that could
make them susceptible to extremist propaganda and the different motivations that could
propel them to extremism. Participants also identified the point at which individuals
might have advanced along the radicalization pathway to a point of no return, shared
insightful recommendations on how to counter extremist messages, and a number of
initiatives aimed at preventing individuals from embracing radicalism.
Two important perspectives emerged during the data collection and analysis.
Because of the inability to recruit participants working with the JTTF, the inclusion
criteria was adjusted to include local police officers working in gang units. It seems to
have been an appropriate adjustment because these officers were able to share a wealth of
knowledge on individual and environmental factors, recruitment, and motivations for
joining gangs. Current research points to similarities between gangs and extremist
movements in terms of reasons for joining, as well as recruitment, and socialization
dynamics. Developing an understanding one group can help inform the other.
An unexpected perspective was the referring to the news media as a “gateway” to
radicalization. The role of the news media as the initial source of exposure to extremist
propaganda that leads individuals to search for more information from the Internet and
social media is not addressed in the literature. This might suggest that contrary to
research, the Internet and social media are neither the sole nor the most significant means
for accessing extremist materials.
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These responses provided the data to answer the research questions. They also
identified areas for further research. The next chapter will encompass the interpretation
of the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to derive empirical data to better
understand the process that leads to the radicalization of U.S. homegrown terrorists and
to apply the religious conversion theory as a model for understanding the radicalization
of U.S. homegrown terrorists. Silke (as cited in Chermak & Gruenwald, 2015) argued
that many scholars relied on literature reviews rather than on original, field-collected data
to develop an understanding of terrorism (p. 134). In this study, I incorporated
radicalization research and interviews with law enforcement officials at the local and
state levels with counterterrorism or gang experience, AT officers, and security personnel
from military installations in Eastern North Carolina.
I sought to identify the environmental factors that contribute to the radicalization
of U.S. homegrown terrorists, the form of intervention that would be effective to curtail
radicalization, and how a modification of the conversion theory would serve to explain
the radicalization of U.S. homegrown terrorists. The participants provided perspectives
on individual and environmental factors that influence the radicalization of U.S.
homegrown terrorists, as well as potentially effective intervention strategies to stem the
rise of extremism. Their answers also provided insights that aided in the assessment of
the conversion theory as a model to understand radicalization. This chapter includes five
sections: interpretation of the findings, limitations of the study, recommendations,
implications, and conclusion. The interpretation of findings is arranged by each of the
research questions.
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Interpretation of the Findings
Research Question 1
The participants offered a number of perspectives related to the factors that
influence radicalization. They acknowledged, however, difficulties in establishing
causality between factors and the adoption of extremist behaviors and attitudes because
of the complex nature of the problem. Personal relationships and support networks
influence the adoption of attitudes, values, belief, and behaviors. Exposure to materials
or propaganda alone does not lead to the adoption of new ideological paradigms.
Individuals interpret information based on their personal narrative. In the case of
extremists, their worldview legitimizes the use of violence to achieve their purposes.
Radicalization relies on the convergence of a person’s contextual factors (individual and
environmental factors), their individual narrative, and the extremist message (Archetti,
2015, p. 54). Alexander (2011) argued that radicalization, recruitment, training, and
methods of attacks vary significantly among individuals (p. 475).
Individual factors
One of the identified gaps in the radicalization literature concerns an
understanding of how individual and social factors influence radicalization. The internal
make-up of individuals, resulting from their life experiences, influences the development
of their psychological profile, personality traits, and cognitive development over time
(Kleinmann, 2012, p. 283). Unless individuals grow up in an environment that exposes
them to extremist imagery and rhetoric, radicalization may occur as the result of a
conscious decision to embark in such a journey. It is important to understand how
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personal narratives mediate radicalization. Individuals interpret information through
lenses shaped by their own views, or narrative. They base their decisions on responding
to a call to action to engage in extremist efforts only if they find the message appealing
and consistent with their beliefs (Archetti, 2015, p. 55). This justifies the need for
considering how individual factors influence radicalization. Participant perspectives
yielded three themes: self-worth, maturity, and cognitive development.
Self-worth. The participant proposed that a lack of self-worth, low self-esteem,
and a lack of purpose or belonging might make individuals susceptible to recruitment into
extremist organizations. These factors are consistent with what Venhaus (as cited in
Borum, 2011) called identity and status seekers. Venhaus (as cited in Borum, 2011)
suggested that individuals embrace radical ideologies and join extremist organizations to
find themselves, their purpose, and a sense of belonging (pp. 26- 27). Pantucci (2011)
further suggested that loners or alienated individuals could be co-opted by terrorist
organizations, exploiting their desire to belong and contribute to a meaningful cause (p.
3). Costanza (2015) posited that the individuals might be willing to accept extermist
interpretations of Islam as a way to gain self-worth, safety, and security in response to a
hostile environment (p. 1).
Maturity. Participants identified maturity-related factors that could make
individuals susceptible to radicalization. From a psychological perspective, mature
individuals should be able to adjust their behaviors to adapt to changes in their
environment. This would require the ability to discern between right and wrong
(Czernochowski, 2014, p. 124). Simi (2016) postulated that radical groups recruitment
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efforts focus on adolescents who do not have the maturity level to understand the
ideology to which they were about to enter (p. 60). These factors point to individual
traits related to diminished ability to make value judgments between acceptable and
unacceptable behaviors, and diminished character growth, which increases the potential
for individuals to become influenced and adopt extremist views.
Cognitive development. The participants postulated that a lack of education,
altered thought processes resulting from psychological events, and weak moral
foundations could make individuals easy prey for extremist recruiters. Existing
technology, such as television, Internet, and video games might have improved certain
forms of cognition among young adults, but at the cost of other skills. Greenfield (as
cited in Cavanaugh, Giapponi, & Golden, 2015) argued that multitasking skills, spatial
visualization, and divided attention skills might have improved with technology; but,
other critical skills such as inductive analysis, critical thinking, and reflection have
declined (p. 377). A child’s upbringing could also affect his or her cognitive
development. Neuroscience researchers suggested a relationship between brain
development, genetic makeup, personal experiences, and the environment (Hopkins,
Green, & Brookes, 2013, p. 26). Critical thinking skills are essential for individuals to
understand the source of their beliefs and to appreciate different points of view, even if
they challenge their own. These are acquired skills through reflection (Hibbert, 2012, p.
805).
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Environmental factors
Another condition that might influence radicalization is the environment that
surrounds the individual. Although individual factors relate to the individual’s personal
background, environmental factors have to do with his or her upbringing, his or her
associations, and his or her support network. The participants argued that environmental
factors, such as lack of positive reinforcement, reactions to events, family life, and
community support could influence the adoption of extremist beliefs and attitudes. These
views are supported by findings in the literature. Kleinmann (2012) postulated that
groups have a socializing effect on individuals. Friends and family members with radical
views could influence individual radicalization ( (Kleinmann, 2012, pp. 284-285).
Archetti (2015) provided a similar argument, in that the nonradical members of the
individuals’ family and associations could be instrumental in preventing their advance
towards radicalization. This should be a consideration in the implementation of efforts to
counter extremist propaganda (Archetti, 2015, p. 55).
Positive reinforcement. The participants observed that individuals lacking
adequate positive support networks that reinforce acceptable values and behaviors are
more likely than not to embrace extremism. These perspectives are consistent with the
findings of Alleyne et al. (2014), who argued that the absence of a support network that
exposes individuals to acceptable values makes them more susceptible to negative
influences that lead to moral disengagement. According to Bandura’s (1986) social
cognitive theory, moral disengagement explains social and antisocial behavior. Bandura
argued that individuals develop the moral constraints that inhibit inhuman behavior and
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facilitate humanity; but, to overcome conflicts in the presence of immoral behavior, they
apply moral disengagement techniques. Gangs also apply moral disengagement to
socialize its members to engage in violence (Alleyne et al., 2014, p. 753). Furthermore,
Simi et al. (2016) found that individuals joining extremist movements were attracted the
group’s reputation and sought to improve their personal standing and significance. These
groups offered the type of support that enables individuals to easily adopt extremist
values and behaviors.
Reactions. According to the participants, individuals could embrace radical
views as a reaction to threats, real or perceived. The responses from the study
participants were consistent with the findings in the literature. For example, Costanza
(2015) argued that political and economic exclusion exacerbates the radicalization
problem among youth (p. 1). Hörnqvist and Flyghed (2012) argued that social
disengagement, resulting from segregated living conditions or unemployment, could lead
to the development of values and mores different from that of society (p. 323). Aly and
Striegher (2012) posited that individuals dissatisfied with U.S. foreign policy, or their
social or political conditions, might embrace radical views (p. 854).
Family life. From the perspective of study participants, the resulting conditions
related to the deterioration of the family are significant contributors to the adoption of
radical behaviors. This is consistent with the work of Goldman, Giles, and Hogg (2014)
who identified maltreatment, poor family structure, poor parenting, and low attachment
between the child and parents as risks factors for gang involvement (p. 816). Costanza
(2015) argued that from a young age, individuals grow up learning extremist values and
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beliefs through indoctrination at home. The social environment affects their cognitive
development and helps to shape their view of the world (Costanza, 2015, p. 1).
Hörnqvist and Flyghed (2012) argued that external pressures and poor social integration
influence individuals’ potential for becoming radicalized (p. 331).
Community support. The participants identified factors related to community
support, especially community disengagement, as contributors to the acceptance of
radical views. The level of community engagement and support could be a factor that
influences radicalization. In the absence of positive community support, coupled with
myriad of individual factors, individuals are susceptible to extremist messaging.
Malthaner (2014) suggested the need for considering how the environment in which
individuals socialize influences their advance along the path to radicalization (p. 640).
Individuals will rely on any source that provides them a sense of belonging and
community support. Ongoing competition among social dynamics could correlate to
susceptibility towards radicalization. According to Archetti (2015), individuals who
embrace extremism find that these views are consistent with their identity and their
individual narratives, and they find a support network within these circles.
When individuals lack certain traits or values, and when their environment does
not provide them with the nurturing, support, or positive feedback they crave, they will
seek it elsewhere. Extremist organizations capitalize on these weaknesses to recruit and
indoctrinate supporters, especially in Western countries. Although there are a variety of
individual and environmental factors that influence radicalization, it is difficult to
quantify each particular category or establish how each contextual factor influences the
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radicalization process, making this an area that could benefit from further research,
especially of a quantitative nature.
Crisis
The confluence of individual and environmental factors can lead to a crisis state,
in which individuals lose a sense emotional or moral balance resulting from a traumatic
episode (Rambo, 1993). The study participants suggested events that could potentially
lead individuals to a crisis state, including losses, perceptions, and external triggers.
These perspectives are consistent with findings in the literature. McCauley, Moskalenko,
and Son (2013) us the term unfreezing to describe sudden changes that result in a
personal crisis. These changes could be financial such as loss of employment, threats of
physical or emotional nature, or relationship problems. Individuals who lose control and
predictability over their lives are more apt to consider sweeping changes in their lives,
such as relationships, behaviors, and values, thus embracing a new paradigm in order to
gain the control or balance they lost (author, year). Aly and Striegher (2012) discussed a
four-phase radicalization model, in which the second phase, self-identification, coincides
with the crisis stage of Rambo’s model (p. 853). When in the self-identification phase,
individuals experience exposure to internal (individual) and external (environmental)
triggers, which could include trauma; social disengagement; and discrimination,
financial, or economic setbacks.
These events could lead individuals to seek mental or emotional stability by
changing significant features in their lives, such as religion, personal significance,
relationships, and associations. Participants argued, however, that it is difficult to point
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to any event as the cause of a crisis because it varies from person to person. This is
consistent with the findings of Aly and Striegher (2012), who found that there is limited
evidence to suggest that the presence of crisis-precipitating events could make
individuals susceptible to radicalization (pp. 859-860).
Losses. The participants considered financial losses, personal losses, death of a
family, or challenges to faith or religious foundation as possible contributors to a loss of
purpose or significance that could lead to crisis. This type of crisis is what Rambo (1993)
categorized as one that causes individuals to question their life and meaning. Events that
could drive individuals to an existential crisis come from a variety of sources. Regardless
of its nature, they could affect the mental and emotional stability of individuals, leading
them to seek other perspectives and usher them to embrace radicalization. There is a
close relationship between individual and environmental factors and the manner in which
individuals react to them. Rambo (1993) reaffirmed the importance on the context on the
severity and extent of the crisis, but also alluded to the degree of activity, or passivity, of
the convert as considerations in the process. Individuals can let someone guide them
along, or they can choose to take a more active role (author, year, p. 45). The dynamics
between factors and the stages of the radicalization continuum highlight their interaction,
making the conversion model an appropriate tool for understanding the path towards
radicalization.
Perceptions. The participants suggested that crisis-generating events might result
from perceptions, such as disenfranchisement, feelings of oppression, or threats.
Bjelopera (2014a) proposed that law enforcement efforts could generate perceptions of

122
unfairness or infringement on constitutional rights and liberties (p. 10). Hinkkainen
(2013) argued that extremist groups choose their targets based on the perceived
assessment of their opposition to organizational objectives: they do not target their
supporters (p. 166). In the case of eco-terrorist movements, they focus their efforts on
targeting property as they advocate for the rights of animals and the preservation of the
environment. These groups consider that traditional means of political pressure, such as
protests, marches, and leafleting would not elicit the appropriate of state attention to their
agenda (author, year, p. 93). Although these perceptions focused on group efforts,
homegrown terrorists who identify with any of these causes are likely to resort to similar
strategies to advance their goals.
External triggers. Another perspective regarding crisis-generating events
concerns external triggers, or actions from external entities. External triggers might
include discrimination, bullying, or peer pressure. Extremist groups, and by extension
extremists, operate in an environment in which they are responding to the action of other
entities. In this instance, extremists are concerned with countering the efforts of
opposition or adversarial groups (Decker & Pyrooz, 2015, p. 107). Individuals might join
extremist groups because of conditions resulting from their environment, resulting from
environmental challenges such as unemployment or lack of parental support, or the
search for protection from threats (Simi et al., 2016, p. 45).
Motivations
Study participants offered insightful perspectives on possible motivations for
embracing extremist beliefs. Although this was not a content-directed code, second cycle
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coding led to its addition. The most common motivations included the need to belong,
grievances, dissatisfaction with status quo, protection or survival, religious zeal, and
seeking a sense of purpose. There are a number of motivations for joining extremist
organizations. According to Hafez and Mullins (2015), these include grievances and
religious or political beliefs (p. 961). Decker and Pyrooz (2015) postulated that gangs
and extremist groups represent an opposition to threats, real or perceived (p. 107).
Participant perspectives regarding motivations to join extremist movements are consistent
with those from the literature. I stopped reviewing here. Please go through the rest of
your chapter and look for the patterns I pointed out to you. I will now look at your
references.
Need to belong. Participant perspectives on this theme suggest that individuals
find themselves not fitting into their environment and seek ways to fill emotional voids or
find acceptance they otherwise do not have, either because they do not have a strong
support network at home or because their views are not consistent with the majority.
These conditions make individuals who do not have strong support networks susceptible
to radicalization. Research into the topic suggests that individuals join gangs to satisfy a
need for belonging and for protection against external threats (Scott, 2014, p. 792). In
this regard, Hafez and Mullins (2015) asserted that individuals who alienate themselves
from society could find extremist messaging that provides a feeling of community
extremely appealing (p. 969).
Grievances. Participants identified grievances that could motivate individuals to
embrace an extremist ideology or join an extremist group. The most common grievance
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identified was actual or perceived affronts against an individual’s culture, ethnicity, or
beliefs. At some point, these grievances might become so overwhelming that they could
lead individuals to embrace alternative views that challenge what they view as oppression
or injustice. Under the right conditions, and with the support of others who share similar
perspectives, these feelings could evolve to the need to take action, and in some cases,
that action could be violence.
According to McCauley et al. (2013) grievances generate feelings of desperation
and outrage that fuel acts of terrorism. Grievances fall into two categories: personal and
political. Personal grievances relate to perceived unjust injuries aimed at the individual,
or loved ones. Political grievances relate to injustices towards a group, or cause
(McCauley, et al., 2013, p. 11). Hafez and Mullins (2015) suggested that individuals
might find themselves economically marginalized, feel alienated from the greater culture
or society, feel victimized, or hold fundamental disagreements with government policies.
They proposed that there is no guarantee that an individual could transition from beliefs
to action, unless there is a catalyst for action (Hafez & Mullins, 2015, p. 961). This is
consistent with Borum’s assertion (as cited in Kleinmann, 2012) that not everyone who
adheres to extremist beliefs is a terrorist (p. 282), as well as Zekulin (2015), who
proposed a distinction between those who provide support extremist causes and those
who are willing to engage in violence (p. 60).
Dissatisfaction with the status quo. According to a 2015 Pew Research Center
poll (n=6004), 57% of U.S. residents expressed frustration with the government, while
22% expressed anger (Doherty, 2015, p. 28). This is not an insignificant percentage.
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Some people might try to improve their lives by seeking better opportunities, but
consistent with those who have grievances, some individuals might resort to less
constructive approaches, such as embracing extremism and violence. Likewise,
according to the social exclusion theory, individuals who live within the margins of
society, and are unable to improve their conditions because of discrimination or social
alienation, are more likely to embrace radical views (Hörnqvist & Flyghed, 2012, p. 323).
In Europe, Muslim immigrants contend with poor economic conditions, unemployment,
and residential segregation. According to Hafez and Mullins (2015) these conditions lead
to higher crime rates in these areas and the development of stereotypes, which makes
these individuals highly susceptible to engaging in extremist or radical behaviors (p.
962).
Protection or survival. According to participants, one of the many motivations
for individuals to join extremist groups or gangs is for protection or survival against real
or perceived threats. Human nature moves individuals to seek security as a basic
necessity, leading to the search for protection or protector (Maslow, 1943, p. 380). Simi,
Windisch, and Sporer (2016) suggested that youths joined gangs for protection from
bullying and threats from other gangs in their community (p. 50). In a prison setting,
Toch (as cited in Scott, 2014) found that inmates generally must either engage in violence
to defend themselves or seek protection (p. 783).
Religious zeal. Religion could influence individuals to embrace extremism.
Study participants suggested that religion could serve as a mediating factor that leads
individuals to embrace extremism. Radicalization literature has many cases of how
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religion could influence individuals to embrace extremism. Examples include Osama Bin
Ladin’s fatwa to wage jihad against the United States (Rudner, 2013, p. 955), ISIS’
appeal to its supporters to conduct terrorist attack in West (Schultz, 2014), or the
justification of right wing extremists to bomb abortion clinics. Religious zeal is not
necessarily a leading cause of radicalization, but it could serve a socializing or
indoctrinating tool for extremists to manipulate others. Security officials argue that
individuals who travel abroad to fight in Syria and Iraq are not necessarily driven by
religious zeal, but more so by a quest for adventure, consistent with thrill seeking
behaviors (Byman & Shapiro, 2014, p. 5).
Seeking a sense of purpose. Participants suggested that individuals might
embrace extremism seeking a sense of purpose they did not have. Accordingly, they join
extremist groups to contribute to a cause and to be remembered. When considering the
Theory of Human Motivation in this context, this is perhaps an attempt to reach the
highest level in the hierarchy of needs, which usually occurs when the individual has
satisfied all other basic needs (Maslow, 1943, p. 383). This is consistent with the
culturalist perspective, which suggests that the main drive behind embracing radical
views and engaging in violence has little to with the individual’s socioeconomic status,
but rather a desire to strike against perceived injustices, sparked by a lack of direction and
naiveté (Hörnqvist & Flyghed, 2012, p. 326).
Accessing extremist propaganda
Radicalization research contains ample data addressing the manner in which
individuals might access extremist propaganda. While there are a variety of means by
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which this information might become available to potential homegrown terrorists, the
literature suggests that the Internet and social media are the predominant medium for
propagation and acquisition. Regardless of the means of propagation, research suggests
that extremists are effectively disseminating their propaganda and it influences the
radicalization of susceptible individuals. It is also important to note that these messages
could lead to moral disengagement, which provides justification for violent behavior
(Alleyne, Fernandes, & Pritchard, 2014, p. 752). The perspectives of study participants
on this topic generally align with findings in the literature, with the notable exception of
the news media serving as a “gateway” for accessing extremist propaganda.
Internet and social media. The majority of participants pointed to the Internet
and social media as the main source for individuals to access extremist propaganda. The
advent of the Internet has allowed extremist groups to reach broader audiences (Spaaij &
Hammd, 2015, p. 170). Terrorist groups have leveraged the power of the Internet to
make their ideology available to everyone. Al Qaeda publishes an online periodical,
Inspire Magazine, which not only serves as a vehicle for ideological indoctrination, but
also provides practical guides for the manufacture of bombs and how to conduct terrorist
attacks (Theohary & Rollins, 2011). ISIS has gone further by developing videos that
rival Hollywood style productions, and are readily available via all the known social
media venues (Gunaratna, 2015, p. 11).
The Internet has also allowed the formation of virtual communities, providing
potential recruits with the support and positive reinforcement they lack at home
(Bowman-Grieve, 2013). Sageman (as cited in Gunaratna and Haynal, 2013) argued that
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the Internet provides the means to develop a sense of unity and purpose that could lead to
further radicalization through personal contact. Likewise, Lemieux, Brachman, Levitt,
and Wood (2014), asserted that online content has influenced the growth of homegrown
terrorism by providing ideological content to further radicalization and technical
knowledge that could enable homegrown terrorists to carry out attacks successfully (p.
368).
The role of extremist narratives propagated via mass media, the Internet, and
social media on radicalization is a matter of debate. According to Archetti (2015), one of
the gaps in the research is an understanding the mediating effect of the Internet and social
media on radicalization. Research on the topic suggests that extremist groups have
capitalized on the power of social media and the Internet to disseminate their message.
These statements illustrate the importance of the Internet and social media as a preferred
means to propagate extremist messages, but also point to other means of disseminating
extremist propaganda.
News media. According to participants, the media, specifically news and other
commercial broadcasting methods contribute to the dissemination of messages that
generate or exacerbate the crisis state and influence the path to radicalization. Research
suggests that news coverage of terror attacks causes an increase in the severity of new
attacks within the next two months and the number of attacks in the proceeding ten
months (Beckmann, Ralf, & Tobias, 2017, p. 15). While the study did not assess how the
coverage influenced individuals, it supports the premise that news coverage influences
terrorism. Terrorist organizations, through their attacks and the corresponding news
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coverage, aim to garner attention to their grievances and objectives, and gain credibility
(Nacos, 2012, p. 265). The advent of satellite television allows for the instantaneous
dissemination of the struggles of people living in contested areas such as Iraq and Syria.
These images have a polarizing effect on the viewers, increasing the perceptions of
sectarian strife (Byman & Shapiro, 2014, p. 2). These broadcasts could serve as a
catalyst for individuals in search of a purpose in their lives, to travel to those regions to
fight against their enemies. They can also decide to conduct attacks in their home
countries if they are unable to travel.
Other means. Simi (2016) found that extreme right-wing recruiting efforts
recognize the need for gradual indoctrination so they leverage social events such as music
shows and house parties (p. 59). They also used stickers, fliers, and leaflets, face-to-face
engagements, and music concerts (pp. 62-70). They disseminate their message of
intolerance and violence through a variety of media and target impressionable at-risk
youth. Radicalization within the prison systems is another area of concern. Basra and
Neumann (2016) found that ISIS and other terrorist organizations recruit members among
the imprisoned population (p. 25). Prison is also an initial point of contact for far-right
extremists (Simi, 2016, p. 194).
The perspectives of the study participants were generally consistent with the
findings of the literature. It is imperative to acknowledge that regardless of the means by
which they access the extremist propaganda, absent the aforementioned individual and
environmental factors, individuals will not embrace radical ideologies and attitudes. The
concept of the media serving as a “gateway” or entry point for further exploration of
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extremist propaganda via the Internet is intriguing. The aspect of the Internet as a
supporting element of accessing extremist information is perhaps an area that could
benefit from further research.
Research Question 2
Understanding the factors that influence radicalization is instrumental to the
developing of strategies to counteract the recruiting efforts of extremists. Because of its
complex nature, and because individuals present a variety of typologies, radicalization
presents significant challenges to those who would attempt to implement efforts to stem
the growth of homegrown terrorism. It is also important to consider the manner in which
they access the extremist propaganda, since this would suggest a more practical approach
for countering it. Individuals who do not have the support and nurturing they crave
usually find then within the virtual setting of online forums, but surrounded by extremists
who exploit their weaknesses (Neumann, 2013, p. 432).
Participants offered a large number of recommendations on what they thought
would constitute effective intervention approaches. Their proposals included creating
doubt about the justification for embracing extremism, leveraging reformed extremists or
gang members to dissuade others from advancing along the radicalization path, and
greater community involvement. These approaches are consistent with Aly and Striegher
(2012), who recommended the implementation of comprehensive strategies to counter
extremist views and beliefs (p. 850), and Alexander (2011), who argued for the
development of alternative or counter narratives to lessen the influence of extremist
propaganda (p. 478). According to Dalgaard-Nielsen (2013), extremist narratives have
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many contradictions, moral dilemmas, and conflicts that could serve as an entry point for
counter radicalization efforts (p. 111). A comparison of participants’ proposals with
recommendations of the literature suggests a high degree of consonance in terms of ideas
and perspectives.
Creating doubt
Participants suggested the creation of doubt in the mind of the radicalized
individual regarding the legitimacy of their behaviors as a means to counter the influence
of extremist messages. Counter radicalization research advocates for the implementation
of measures to discredit extremist messages and to educate individuals so they are able to
refute or question the validity of the propaganda (Neumann, 2013, p. 433). DalgaardNielsen (2013) studied programs that helped individual militants disengage or exit from
violent Islamist extremist organizations in Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East. The
analysis shed light on how creating doubt in the mind of the militant was a useful
approach, especially as it related to the use of violence and the killing of civilians (p. 103)
and the desire to protect loved ones from the consequences of their extremist behaviors
(p. 106). Decker, Pyrooz, and Moule Jr.(2014) researched gang disengagement and
found that violence creates a sense of doubt among gang members, which could lead to
reduced willingness to engage in violence (p. 280). Behavior modification, through the
creation of doubt, could lead to sufficient separation from the extremist group’s core
values, resulting in improved probability of success in deradicalization efforts.
Leveraging former extremists
Closely related to this strategy, was the collaboration with former extremists or
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gang members to engage individuals and share their experiences in an effort to dissuade
them from following in their footsteps. Participants suggested greater collaboration with
former extremists or gang members to engage individuals and share their experiences in
an effort to dissuade them from following in their footsteps. In their study, Kruglanski, et
al., (2014) discussed the collaboration of a former Abu Sayyaf Group member with the
government deradicalization efforts, yet did not specify his role. Dalgaard-Nielsen
(2013) supported the inclusion of former extremists to influence individuals suceptible to
radicalization ( p. 109). Former extremists or gang members could also support counter
radicalization efforts by informing research that could lead to the implementation of
appropriate intervention strategies. The literature has a robust body of research involving
former extremists or gang members. Simi, Windisch, and Sporer (2016) gathered
valuable data from former violent extremists for their research.
Their findings suggest that early childhood trauma can potentially create the
conditions that make individuals suceptible to the influence of extermists or gang
members (p. 126). Kruglanski and colleagues (2014) also gathered data from former
extremists on how their loss of significance influenced their adoption of extremist and
violent behaviors. Dalgaard-Nielsen’s (2013) research on the reasons why militants leave
extremist organizations could also provide useful insights to inform counter radicalization
efforts. Militants might lose faith in the justifications for violence and the validity of the
group’s arguments; they might lose faith in the organization or its leadership; or finally,
changes in the militant’s perspective or circumstances that made them question their
commitment to the cause of the extremist group (p. 102). All three reasons involved
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external influences that were able to alter militants’ worldview and capitalize on their
doubts. Decker, Pyrooz, and Moule Jr. (2014) interviewed 260 former gang members in
a variety of settings to understand disengagement dynamics (p. 271).
Greater community involvement
Understanding that the environment influences behaviors and attitudes,
participants shared their perspectives on what elements within the community could
contribute in deterring individuals from embracing extremism. They identified
community stakeholders such as family or parents, people with influence or knowledge,
churches or religious leaders, and community organizations that could become involved
in efforts to counter extremist efforts to radicalize individuals. This perspective coincides
with that of radicalization researchers, who recommended approaches focuses on
educating and influencing non-radicalized members of the individual’s family or
associations, since they would have greater influence on their behavior (Archetti, 2015, p.
56). Byman and Shapiro (2014), argued that programs should leverage local community
leaders key communicators, because they who would focus on practical concerns (p. 24).
Bjelopera (2014a) plainly suggested that local leaders should be at the forefront of
engaging with the people of their community, rather than outsiders with little local
knowledge and influence (p. 9).
Challenges
The implementation of intervention strategies is a difficult task because
individuals present a variety of typologies and existing efforts might not be effective for
all potential homegrown terrorists, especially if they do not consider the dynamics of
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local communities. Participants identified ineffective government responses and
difficulty in recognizing indicators as the most significant challenges associated with the
implementation of counter extremist efforts. Current research highlights difficulties in
developing programs aimed at countering extremism, particularly because one approach
might not work in all settings (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013, p. 108).
Ineffective government responses. Intervention programs have proven
ineffective for a variety of reasons. Participants suggested that these efforts do not reach
their intended target audiences. It is critical to enlist the assistance of individuals and
organizations that could influence individuals susceptible to radicalization or who have
already embraced extremism. Dechesne (2011) argued that deradicalization efforts
should consider the inclusion of non-repressive initiatives and incentives to motivate
radicalized individuals to renounce violence and to become part of the community (p.
288). These views reinforce Bjelopera (2014a), who posited that law enforcement efforts
could generate mistrust and unwillingness within the community to cooperate with them
because of perceptions of unfairness or infringement on constitutional rights and liberties
(p. 10). They are also consistent with Costanza (2015) who advocated for the
collaboration among a broad set of stakeholders to counter extremist indoctrination,
including the family, civic and social organizations, government, and non-governmental
organizations (p. 15). Weine (2013) recommended a closer collaboration between law
enforcement, relevant government agencies, the media, and community organizations to
provide a synergistic approach to countering radicalization (p. 88). Adding to these
difficulties, extremist behaviors short of violence have constitutional protections
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(Bjelopera, 2014b, p. 2), thus limiting the ability of law enforcement and
counterterrorism agenices to prevent terrorist attacks.
Difficulty in recognizing indicators. Klausen et al. (2016) argued that overt
behaviors change as individuals advance along the radicalization pathway (p. 69). This
highlights the importance of knowing what indicators to look for. Participants suggested
that the inability to recognize indications of extremist behaviors that could lead to
violence hinders intervention efforts and argued that while some people might notice
some signs, they might fail to put them in context. Consistent with this perspective,
Archetti (2015) proposed that efforts should center on educating and influencing family
members, co-workers, and other non-radicalized associates because they could have
greater sway and credibility with those who are susceptible to radicalization or who are
already exhibiting indicators of embracing extremist views (p. 56). Byman and Shapiro
(2014) likewise highlighted the need to enlist the support of community organizations to
increase awareness and understanding of sources of radicalization (p. 24).
Research Question 3
A gap in the radicalization research is the lack of a comprehensive model for
understanding this process. According to Ferguson and Binks (2015), radicalization
processes share similarities with religious conversion and the use of a religious
conversion model could be useful in understanding the concept (p. 26). This led to the
selection of the Religious Conversion Theory (Rambo, 1993) to provide the framework
for this study. The Conversion Theory incorporates aspects of sociology, psychology,
anthropology, and religious studies, providing a holistic perspective for viewing
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radicalization. Rambo (1993) postulated that in order to comprehend radicalization,
researchers must understand the individuals’ environment (context), which includes
individual and environmental factors, their loss of emotional or moral balance resulting
from a traumatic episode (crisis), their desire to regain the lost balance (quest), and the
emergence of a guide or advocate to assist in the quest for balance (encounter). The
strengthening of the relationship with the advocate or guide and the introduction of a new
ideology (interaction) leads to the individual’s conscious decision to embrace new values
and beliefs (commitment). The final stage concerns the outcomes from this commitment
(consequences). This model should assist in understanding the progressive nature of
radicalization and help identify areas in which key stakeholders might be able to
intervene and disrupt the process.
Context and Commitment
While the Conversion Theory provides a holistic perspective for viewing
radicalization, by incorporating features from sociology, psychology, anthropology, and
religious studies, it does not consider factors that could influence radicalization. The
stages of radicalization that the model provides help visualize the progression towards
extremism, but the inclusion of other perspectives into the Context and Commitment
stages could improve its utility.
Perhaps a more nuanced approach would entail the inclusion of tenets of
Maslow’s Theory of Human Motivation (1943), rather than just the presence or absence
of factors within the Context stage. This stage refers to the collection of individual and
environmental factors that make an individual susceptible to enter into a crisis stage. The
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factors by themselves, fail to explain why individuals experience crisis. According to
Maslow, behavior is the expression of the motivation of individuals to satisfy certain
needs. The attainment of one need generates the motivation for the satisfaction of the
next, until achieving all needs, reaching self-actualization. We should consider how the
individual reacts to its environment, but the environment alone does not sufficiently
explain behavior (pp. 370-371). The Context stage could benefit from a deliberate
analysis of the level of satisfaction of individuals, rather than the presence or absence of
factors. The inability to satisfy basic needs is a more reasonable explanation for
experiencing crisis and for advancing along the radicalization continuum. Individuals
who feel satisfied with the attainment of their basic needs would unlikely enter into a
crisis state, and if they did, they would likely be resilient enough to withstand without
changing their core beliefs and values.
Point of no return
The point of no return in terms of radicalization refers to the point in which
individuals have become fully committed to their cause and have little chance of deescalating and returning to an earlier stage in the process. The literature provides several
perspectives of the point of no return along the radicalization continuum. McCauley,
Moskalenko, and Son (2013) referred a continued indoctrination process of that leads
individuals to lose any sensitivity against violence (p. 8). In their study of Jack Roche, an
Australian homegrown terrorist, Aly and Striegher (2012), found that although Roche had
misgivings about his assigned task to bomb the Israeli embassy in Canberra, he continued
with his assignment because he feared his handlers would physically harm him (p. 857).
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It would be useful to assess how individuals overcame their innate abhorrence
towards inhumanity. The next adjustment would therefore incorporate Bandura’s Social
Cognitive Theory (1986), which explains social and antisocial behavior, specifically as it
relates to the application of moral disengagement, into the Commitment stage to identify
the point of no return. The acceptance of a new ideology that leads to the Consequences
stage lacks a mechanism of action as it relates to radicalization and the adoption of
violence as an acceptable form of expression. This is not a normal pattern of behavior for
most people and points to a socialization process aimed at overcoming innate aversions
towards violence.
Bandura (1986) argued that individuals apply moral disengagement techniques to
overcome conflicts in the presence of immoral behavior. Moral disengagement is the
process by which individuals justify behaviors that most people would consider
reprehensible, and it features prominently in literature as a key mechanism for
indoctrination and the justification of violence (Bandura, 1999; Bandura, 2004; Aly,
Taylor, & Karnovsky, 2014; Alleyne, Fernandes, & Pritchard, 2014; Goldman et al.,
2014; and Simi, Windisch, & Sporer, 2016).
Limitations of the Study
Because of its qualitative nature, the background of the participants, and small
sample size, this study might not provide generalizable findings that could apply to other
areas of the country. The application of the Conversion also prevented the consideration
of other factors outside of its theoretical framework. Finally, while the study participants
provided valuable insights into radicalization, their perspectives were constrained by their
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level of experience and training on counterterrorism, antiterrorism, and gang
investigations. Very few participants had actual experience in counterterrorism
investigations at the federal level, given the inability to recruit participants from the FBI
or local law enforcement working with the JTTF.
Recommendations for Action
This study found that local and state law enforcement officers, military AT and
security personnel share consistent perspectives on factors that influence radicalization
and potential intervention approaches. Given the scope of their duties, it was expected
that state law enforcement and military personnel would have the training and experience
to provide informed perspectives to address the research questions. There was a question
however, of the quality of the perspectives from local law enforcement officers. While
initial impressions might have suggested they might not have the appropriate level of
experience and training, their work with criminal gangs and gang members allowed them
to contribute to this study with informed perspectives that were consistent with the
findings of existing research in the field of radicalization.
In addition, the inclusion of law enforcement officers with experience in gang
investigations imbued the study with perspectives that highlighted the importance of local
law enforcement agencies in stemming the rise of extremist behaviors in local
communities. Federal agencies, including the DoD, have been successful in preventing
large-scale terrorist attacks in the United States since the events of September 11, 2001,
by focusing their efforts on terrorist organizations and networks abroad. The
transformation of the threat into decentralized planned and executed operations, justifies
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the involvement of local law enforcement agencies in this effort in a more deliberate
manner. Based on these findings, the following proposals are recommended.
Radicalization training
Study participants suggested that individual factors and environmental factors
such could influence the adoption of extremist beliefs and behaviors. They also noted
that the inability to identify these factors make it difficult to implement effective
intervention approaches. These perspectives are supported by findings in the literature.
It is recommended therefore, that law enforcement agencies, at all levels, institute
ongoing training for local police departments that focuses on the identification of
indicators of radicalization among members of the communities in which they patrol.
The implementation of community policing initiatives highlights the importance of local
police at being able to identify the presence of extremist behaviors in the communities
with whom they interact. They are usually the first on the scene; they should know what
to look for in terms of radicalization and potential terrorist threats.
Intervention strategies
Participants offered suggested a variety of intervention approaches they
considered would be effective in stemming the rise of radicalization in their jurisdictions.
These included creating doubt about the justification for embracing extremism,
leveraging reformed extremists or gang members, and greater community involvement.
They also identified a number of challenges related to the implementation of effective
and sustainable intervention approaches, such as ineffective government responses and
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difficulty in recognizing indicators. Participant views are consistent with findings in the
literature as well.
It is recommended then, that intervention strategies include all community
stakeholders, which could leverage their capabilities to overcome capability gaps of other
organizations. Collaboration among stakeholders should not be limited to government
agencies. It should include local civic and volunteer organizations that work within the
community and understand local dynamics.
Another recommendation would entail the development of quantifiable measures
of effectiveness to assess intervention programs and determine the feasibility of
implementing them in other geographies. Law enforcement agencies are working
diligently within their jurisdictions with acknowledged resource constraints that require
the allocation of resources to efforts with demonstrated measures of effectiveness. This
assessment would also allow for prioritizing efforts in terms of focus and resources.
Local police departments should also share their best practices with other
jurisdictions, especially regarding the implementation of intervention programs aimed at
disengaging community members from gangs. These programs could inform state and
federal level programs since they consider local dynamics and conditions. Likewise,
federal efforts should include greater funding and resources to assist local law
enforcement so they can manage the threat at the lowest level possible. This should be a
cooperative effort, not a competition.
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Recommendations for Further Study
The study findings highlighted two areas for further research. First, while the
literature and most participants identified the Internet and social media as the main
sources of extremist propaganda, several participants suggested that the news media
served as “gateway” or entry point for further exploration of extremist propaganda via the
Internet, making the Internet a supporting mechanism rather than the primary source.
Findings in this area could potentially guide future intervention efforts to address
developing trends and patterns.
Second, the inclusion of perspectives from other radicalization related theories
could imbue the Conversion Theory and its application against known cases of
homegrown terrorists could serve as a real test of its viability as a model to understand
radicalization. The literature suggests that research suffers from a lack of a
comprehensive model for understanding radicalization. It also recommends theory
making and testing, which could validate these models and inform intervention
approaches.
Implications
This study sought to increase the understanding of the process that leads to the
radicalization of U.S. homegrown terrorists. It has significant social as well as public
policy implications. It is important to understand the factors that mediate the
radicalization process before attempting to develop intervention strategies, lest they
squander limited resources and become hollow efforts. Efforts to counter the rise of
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extremism in our communities require a holistic approach that leverages the capabilities
of community stakeholders.
This study could bring about positive social change by improving the degree of
collaboration between individuals, government agencies, and community-based
organizations, which could lead to the implementation of comprehensive strategies that
have greater probability of success. Furthermore, the coordinated efforts between
stakeholders, especially law enforcement agencies and community-based organizations
might also improve their relationship with local constituencies, resulting in less
marginalization and less need for repressive methods to ensure public safety. Finally, by
understanding the factors that lead individuals to embrace extremism, all stakeholders
could help improve the quality of life of all members of society, assisting them to achieve
their potential, which in turn will make our communities stronger and more resilient.
Conclusion
Homegrown terrorism plots and attacks have risen significantly in recent years.
Every day, news media reports highlight the aftermath of these events. The first step in
combating this rising trend is understanding the factors that lead individuals down that
path. Well-meaning intervention programs that fail to consider local dynamics, or ignore
the perspectives of those charged with public safety are likely to perform poorly. This
problem affects all sectors of society, so the solution cannot emanate solely from the law
enforcement.
Study participants included an array of law enforcement officials at the local and
state levels with counterterrorism or gang experience, antiterrorism officers, and security
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personnel from military installations in eastern North Carolina. This study sought to
identify relevant individual and environmental factors that contribute to the radicalization
of U.S. homegrown terrorists, the form of intervention that would be effective to curtail
radicalization, and how would a modification of the Conversion Theory could serve to
better understand the radicalization of U.S. homegrown terrorists. The collective
experience and training of the participants enabled them to provide informed perspectives
to answer the research questions. They offered a number of perspectives related to the
factors that influence radicalization. Personal relationships and support networks
influence the adoption of attitudes, values, belief, and behaviors. Study participants
identified 58 individual factors categorized under self-worth, maturity, and cognitive
development that that in their view could predispose individuals to embrace extremism.
They also identified 76 environmental factors that could also influence
radicalization. The most salient factors included positive reinforcement, reactions, family
life, and community support. Regarding intervention strategies to prevent individuals
from advancing along the radicalization process, participants identified 41 efforts. The
most commonly suggested approaches were the creation of doubt among at-risk
individuals regarding the validity of their extremist ideology, leveraging former
extremists, and greater community involvement. In general, their perspectives were
consistent with the findings in the literature, suggesting a high degree of validity.
Finally, after applying the Conversion Theory to this qualitative case study, it was
assessed that the inclusion of other theoretical perspectives, such as the Theory of Human
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Motivation and Moral Disengagement could provide a more comprehensive model for
understanding radicalization.
Participant perspectives highlighted the need for increased collaboration among as
many stakeholders as possible. While local law enforcement agencies strive to make
their communities safer, they are sometimes challenged by shortfalls in resources and
lack of cooperation. Their contributions are critical to ensure the security of the people
living in eastern North Carolina. A comprehensive approach to addressing radicalization
would empower stakeholders from many sectors of the community to collaborate in the
effort, which could improve relationships among the many constituencies, requiring less
repressive methods to ensure public safety, while reducing marginalization, and
improving the ability of all members of the community to achieve their potential.
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Appendix A: Interview Questionnaire
Introduction of Study
The purpose of this study is to develop an understanding of the process that leads
to the radicalization of U.S. homegrown terrorists based on interviews with a variety of
law enforcement officials, military antiterrorism (AT) officers. You were asked to
participate in this study because of your knowledge and experience in this field, and your
proximity to a key site or military facility that would be targets of terrorism. The study
will not focus on specific ideologies, religious beliefs, or political philosophies, but rather
the radicalization process in general. The interview will consist of ten questions and you
should answer them using your experience, training, and personal knowledge; the study
will not focus on departmental procedures. The findings of this study should help
develop an evidence-based understanding of radicalization, which is a key aspect of
homegrown terrorism.
1. Describe your counterterrorism training and any experiences with terrorism in the
field.
2. How would you define homegrown terrorism? In your view, which group represents
the most significant homegrown terrorism threat?
3. What individual factors (education, financial, social standing, family) might make an
individual susceptible to radicalization?
4. What environmental factors (family, friends, associations) might make an individual
susceptible to radicalization?
5. What type of event might cause an individual to embrace extremism?
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6. How do radicalized individuals encounter extremist propaganda?
7. What would be an effective approach to counter extremist propaganda?
8. At what point of the radicalization process are individuals past the point of effective
intervention?
9. Is there anything you would like to add that might be useful in understanding the
radicalization of U.S. homegrown terrorists?
10.

Do you know of anyone else who might be able to provide more information on

radicalization?

